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FOREWORD
The mission of the Multilateral 
Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) is 
to promote foreign direct investment(FDI) 
into developing countries to support 
economic growth, reduce poverty, and 
improve people’s lives. As part of this 
mandate, MIGA seeks to foster a better 
understanding of investors’ perceptions of 
political risk as they relate to FDI, as well 
as the role of the political risk insurance 
(PRI) industry in mitigating these risks. 
As 2012 draws to a close, the economic turbulence 
unleashed by the 2008 global financial crisis persists. 
Although FDI inflows to emerging markets began to 
recover in the years following the crisis, they are ex-
pected to decline this year. The continued high growth 
in developing countries, however, makes them in-
creasingly attractive to foreign investors, who remain 
optimistic about their intentions to invest there. New 
challenges, especially the ongoing sovereign debt 
crisis and recession in the euro zone, have slowed 
the flow of FDI from traditional sources. However, 
FDI outflows from new investors from developing 
countries have risen significantly in recent years, and 
are expected to reach a record level this year.
This report examines investors’ perceptions and 
risk-mitigation strategies as they navigate today’s 
uncertain economic waters. It finds that investors 
continue to rank political risk as a key obstacle to 
investing in developing countries and are increas-
ingly turning toward PRI as a risk-mitigation tool. The 
insurance industry has responded with new products 
and innovative ways to use existing products as well 
as substantial capacity to meet the growing demand.
World Investment and Political Risk 2011 examined the 
triggers of expropriation, and found that authoritar-
ian political regimes have been linked to an increased 
risk of expropriation. This year we look at the risk 
of sovereign defaults, typically caused by adverse 
economic shocks, and how it relates to expropriation. 
Both the risks of sovereign default and expropriation 
remain significant issues for foreign investors amid 
the global economic slowdown and continued politi-
cal instability.
As we continue to gain a deeper understanding 
of political risk through our research, we hope 
that investors will feel more confident in moving 
forward into new markets. With developing countries 
becoming the engines of economic growth in today’s 
multipolar world, the need for investments that 
generate jobs, transfer technology, and build infra-
structure is greater than ever. 
Izumi Kobayashi
Executive Vice President
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EXECUTIvE SUMMARY
Global economic growth estimates for 
2012 indicate a continuing fragile recovery. 
The ongoing sovereign debt crisis and 
recession in the euro zone, curtailed bank 
lending and domestic deleveraging, fluc-
tuating but elevated commodity prices, 
and the ongoing political turmoil in 
the Middle East and North Africa have 
slowed the initial rebound that followed 
the 2008 global financial crisis. This 
slow progress has had an impact on 
developing countries, which initially fared 
well in terms of rebounding growth rates, 
private capital flows, and foreign direct 
investment (FDI). 
Having fallen sharply after the onset of the crisis, FDI 
inflows received by developing countries climbed by 
about $100 billion each subsequent year to reach 
around $640 billion in 2011. In 2012, however, FDI 
inflows into developing countries are estimated 
to fall to just under $600 billion. All developing 
regions experienced a decline in 2012, except for 
Latin America and the Caribbean. In contrast to 
inflows, FDI outflows from developing countries 
are estimated to have reached nearly $240 billion in 
2012, a new record level. The outward FDI stock of 
developing countries has risen significantly in recent 
years, and about a quarter of this stock is destined 
for other developing countries.
The findings of the MIGA-EIU Political Risk Survey 
2012 underscore that the ongoing weakness 
and instability in the global economy remain 
a top constraint for foreign investors’ plans to 
expand in developing countries in the short term. 
Nevertheless, cognizant of stronger economic growth 
in developing countries, the survey also finds that 
foreign investors remain relatively optimistic in 
their intentions to invest in developing countries in 
the short term (figure 1). Over the medium term, 
foreign investors identify political risk as the most 
significant constraint to investing in developing 
countries. Notwithstanding this, as concerns about 
macroeconomic stability and access to finance 
recede, more foreign investors become optimistic 
in their intentions to invest in developing countries. 
Projections of FDI inflows into developing countries 
support this finding, with estimates for 2013 indi-
cating a rebound to nearly $700 billion.
Despite elevated perceptions of political risk, the 
majority of respondents in the MIGA-EIU Political 
Risk Survey 2012 have no plans to withdraw or cancel 
investments in developing countries. Within the 
range of political risks, adverse regulatory changes 
are the foremost concern to foreign investors over 
both the short and medium term, followed by breach 
of contract. Among those that do plan to withdraw or 
cancel investments, it is again mostly due to adverse 
regulatory changes or breach of contract. These two 
political actions are also responsible for the most 
losses suffered by foreign investors in developing 
countries, according to the survey. The political risk 
that increases the most in perceived significance 
between the short and medium term is expropriation. 
FDI flows into the Middle East and North Africa 
have been adversely affected by political risk over 
the past couple of years. Investor perceptions of 
political risks in the region remain elevated across 
a range of risks. The Arab Spring countries have 
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Figure 1 Changes in  
Foreign Investment Plans
Percent of respondents
Source: MIGA-EIU Political Risk Survey 2012
turmoil unfolded, and estimates of such investment 
remained subdued in 2012, especially in cases where 
significant political instability persists. The MIGA-EIU 
Political Risk Survey 2012 shows that the majority of 
foreign investors are not anticipating big changes 
in their investment plans at present or in the near 
future in Arab Spring countries, and a slightly higher 
proportion of foreign investors plan to divest rather 
than invest. As with all FDI, economic factors will 
play the most important role in foreign investor re-
engagement in the Middle East and North Africa, but 
political stability is also crucial. The survey shows that 
investing or reinvesting in the region is conditional 
first upon more market opportunities, followed by at 
least one year of political stability, macroeconomic 
improvements, and reduced corruption (figure 2). 
One of the conclusions in World Investment and 
Political Risk 2011 was that authoritarian political 
regimes have been linked to an increased risk of 
expropriation. Sovereign defaults, often caused by 
adverse economic shocks, are also linked to the 
political risk of non-honoring of sovereign financial 
obligations. Both the risks of sovereign default and 
expropriation remain significant issues for foreign 
investors amid the global economic slowdown and 
continued political instability. This raises the question 
of whether and how sovereign defaults relate to other 
political risks, in particular expropriation, and this 
is addressed in chapter two of this report. From a 
historical perspective, these events have occurred 
in waves and are usually associated with a shift of 
a country’s external liability position in the balance 
between equity and debt. Following the wave of 
expropriations during the 1970s, a shift to sov-
ereign debt as a source of financing for developing 
countries culminated in sovereign defaults of the 
1980s. Subsequently, as countries that defaulted lost 
access to international capital markets, FDI became 
the major form of foreign capital into developing 
countries. In recent years, developing countries have 
relied more on FDI and portfolio equity than on 
sovereign debt, which suggests that the “prize” for 
expropriating private assets is now larger.
According to the analysis presented in this report, 
sovereign defaults and expropriations rarely occur 
in one country in the same year. Sovereign default 
and expropriation coincided in only five out of 5,360 
cases; the most notable example of these five cases 
was Indonesia during the Asian financial crisis. Still, 
there are several systematic patterns in the occur-
rences of sovereign default and expropriation events 
that are worth highlighting. Typically, sovereign 
defaults coincide with adverse economic shocks and 
Fig 1.3
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fared worse than other developing countries in the 
region. The risk perception of civil disturbance and 
political violence, but also breach of contract, is 
especially prominent in Arab Spring countries. These 
countries saw FDI inflows plummet as political 
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Figure 2  Primary Reasons for 
Investing more, or Reinvesting,  
in the Middle East and North 
Africa
Percent of respondents
Source: MIGA-EIU Political Risk Survey 2012
Over a longer timeframe, however, sovereign defaults 
and expropriations are related in the sense that the 
majority of countries either consistently refrain from 
sovereign default and expropriation, or engage in 
both. It is perhaps not unexpected that the same 
types of countries experience both sovereign defaults 
and expropriations, as is evidenced by the clustering 
of both types of events in two regions, Africa (both 
North and sub-Saharan) and Latin America and the 
Caribbean. The perspectives of foreign investors in 
the MIGA-EIU Political Risk Survey 2012 underline 
perceptions of the positive link between sovereign 
default risk and more generally elevated perceptions 
of political risk. The survey finds that more than half 
of the responding foreign investors believed that an 
increase in sovereign risk increases broader political 
risk, particularly for civil disturbance and breach of 
contract. Even a sovereign credit rating downgrade 
raised concerns for foreign investors about elevated 
risks of expropriation, breach of contract, and transfer 
and convertibility restrictions—especially when the 
new rating was below investment grade and most 
clearly in the case when the new grade was a result of 
a sovereign default.
The fact that political risk is perceived as an 
important constraint to investing in developing 
countries has been a boon for the political risk 
insurance (PRI) industry. New issuance of PRI by 
members of the Berne Union—the leading asso-
ciation of public, private, and multilateral insurance 
providers—increased by 13 percent in 2011, setting 
a new volume record. Expressed as a ratio of FDI 
inflows into developing countries, new PRI has 
risen to 12 percent on average during 2009-2011, 
compared with a 10 percent average during 2006-
2008. As of the first half of 2012, PRI issuance was 
still growing strongly, with another record level 
forecast for 2012. The current main drivers of the 
increased demand have been the events in the 
Middle East and North Africa, which have raised the 
specter of unanticipated events in seemingly stable 
political regimes; recent expropriations in Latin 
America; contract renegotiations in resource-rich 
economies; and capital constraints and increased 
regulation for financial institutions, which make 
financing with PRI an attractive option. 
Notwithstanding increasing covers, the bulk of FDI 
remains uninsured against political risk. According 
to the MIGA-EIU Political Risk Survey 2012, only 18 
percent of the responding firms use PRI as a risk-
mitigation tool, a proportion that has changed only 
marginally over the past four years. The explanation 
for this rests partly on the perception that some 
Fig 1.14
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Increased market
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One year of
political stability
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macroeconomic
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Other 
higher debt burdens, while the likelihood of expropri-
ations is explained by the type of political regime. In 
addition, sovereign default events are less persistent 
because it is not possible for a country to default 
on its debt obligations year after year. In contrast, 
expropriation events do tend to persist because they 
are often localized, clustered in specific countries or 
sectors within a country, and may well be repeated 
multiple times. Since it is not typically the case that 
a government will expropriate its private sector all 
at once, expropriations occur incrementally. For 
example, from 1970 to 2004, of the 78 countries that 
expropriated private assets, 70 percent did so two or 
more times.
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Figure 3 Risk Mitigation Strategies 
by Foreign Investors
Percent of respondents
Source:  MIGA-EIU Political Risk Survey 2012
Note:  Percentages add up to more than 100 percent 
because of multiple selections
political risks (for example, political violence) cannot 
be effectively mitigated by PRI (figure 3). For other 
risks, informal political risk mitigation prevails. For 
breach of contract, bringing in local partners through 
joint ventures has been the preferred risk-mitigation 
tool. It is only in the case of expropriations that 
foreign investors give relatively high marks to PRI; but 
even for this risk, informal relationships with political 
leaders continue to be viewed as a more effective 
approach to risk management.
The increase in demand for PRI has been mostly 
broad-based across all political risks, while both 
specialized PRI and broader universal insurance 
coverage have tended to move largely in parallel. 
Geographically, there has been considerable demand 
for PRI in developing Asia, reflecting the sizeable FDI 
received by that region and the existence of many 
large infrastructure projects. More recently, there 
has been a marked increase in inquiries for PRI for 
investments in the Southern euro-zone countries due 
to heightened perceptions of political risks resulting 
from the sovereign debt crisis. This has gone against 
the earlier conventional wisdom that political risks 
are present in developing countries alone. Among 
Berne Union members, demand for coverage from 
public providers has increased at a faster rate than 
for private providers. Demand for South-based public 
PRI providers (among members of the Berne Union) 
has also increased considerably because of the rapid 
growth in outward FDI from developing countries in 
recent years.
The elevated political risk perceptions of investors 
have revived demand for existing products and 
have given rise to new product offerings. In light of 
elevated political risk in the Middle East and North 
Africa, there has been renewed interest in coverage 
for existing investments, while concerns about stress 
on public finances has led public providers to offer 
coverage for non-honoring of sovereign financial obli-
gations. While the Lloyd’s market has been offering 
this coverage for some time, the entry of public pro-
viders has permitted an increase in both capacity and 
tenors. 
The claims picture remains volatile and changing in 
nature and recoveries have been consistently lower 
over the past five years. Claims rose sharply in both 
2010 and 2011, in the latter year as a result of political 
upheaval in the Middle East and North Africa. Most 
claims in terms of value were attributed to political 
violence in 2011, while the trend until then for the 
bulk of claims had been for expropriation and breach 
of contract. 
Fig 3 .9
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Despite the growth in demand, capacity in the PRI 
industry has not been a constraint so far. Estimates 
place an increase in capacity in the private and 
Lloyd’s PRI market at 19 percent between January and 
July 2012, mostly on tenors of 10 years or less. New 
PRI providers, such as the XL Group and Canopius, 
have also entered the private and Lloyd’s PRI market, 
while the public PRI market has expanded with 
the addition of the Export Insurance Agency of the 
Russian Federation. 
PRI capacity and pricing are not idiosyncratic, 
but respond to trends in the broader insurance 
industry and its cycles. Capacity for the PRI industry 
is therefore affected by factors that influence the 
broader insurance industry, such as market devel-
opments for other insurance lines and new regu-
latory changes, such as the new Solvency II rules 
in the European Union and the Basel III regulatory 
framework. The prevailing low interest rate envi-
ronment has put downward pressure on financial 
returns, which are part of the business model of 
insurance companies, and has led to shifts within the 
insurance industry into more profitable specialized 
lines, such as PRI. All of these developments have 
contributed to the increased capacity in the PRI 
industry and have also led to the perpetuation of a 
“soft premium” environment, a trend that does not 
appear likely to change in the near term. 
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CHAPTER ONE
WORLD INvESTMENT TRENDS
AND CORPORATE PERSPECTIvES
 r Global economic growth estimates for 2012 indicate a continuing 
fragile recovery with significant downside risks. Private capital flows 
to developing countries moderated significantly, while foreign direct 
investment (FDI) inflows declined across all developing regions, with 
the exception of Latin America and the Caribbean. 
 r Despite the decline in FDI inflows to developing countries, they 
continue to account for a substantial share of global FDI: in 2012 they 
are estimated to be 36 percent of inflows and 14 percent of outflows. 
 r FDI inflows to developing countries are expected to rebound in 2013 
to just under $700 billion and reach close to $800 billion in 2014. 
MIGA’s survey of corporate investors corroborates this expectation, 
with the majority of investors in these markets being moderately opti-
mistic about their investment intentions over the next twelve months, 
but more optimistic over the next three years. 
 r FDI outflows from developing countries reached a new record in 2012, 
an estimated $237 billion, continuing the upward trend of recent years. 
About a quarter of the outward FDI stock of developing countries goes 
into other developing countries (“South-South” investment).
 r While economic instability and access to finance continue to be key 
concerns of companies investing overseas over the next 12 months, 
mirroring the state of the global economy, political risk features as the 
most important concern over the next three years.
 r Political instability in the Middle East and North Africa has taken a toll 
on investment intentions and has elevated perceptions of political risk, 
not only for the Arab Spring countries, but also for other countries 
in the region. Political and economic stability are inducements for 
corporate investors to return, but the findings of MIGA’s survey of 
corporate investors indicate market opportunities are more important 
over the medium term for encouraging investor re-engagement. 
MIGA WIPR REPORT 2012   |  13   
This chapter presents the highlights of recent 
developments in the global economy; an overview 
of the principal trends in FDI flows into and from 
developing countries; the findings of a corporate 
survey of foreign investors regarding their investment 
intentions over the next twelve-month and three-year 
time horizons; and perceptions of the main con-
straints to investing overseas. South-South FDI and 
foreign investor perceptions of risks and conditions 
for re-engagement in the Middle East and North 
Africa are also highlighted in this chapter. 
Prospects for Global Growth
The world economy weakened in 2011, accentuated 
by the sovereign debt crisis in Europe, natural 
disasters in Japan and Thailand, and the effects of 
earlier monetary tightening in emerging markets to 
combat the threat of inflation. Positive economic 
developments in the first quarter of 2012 gave way to 
headwinds, as the crisis in the euro zone—coupled 
with financial sector stress, ongoing regulatory uncer-
tainty, and plunging investor confidence—dampened 
global economic growth forecasts. As a result, these 
forecasts for 2012 have been continuously revised 
downward and real GDP growth is not expected to 
experience an uptick until 2013 (table 1.1). 
Among the high-income economies, despite early 
signs of growth acceleration, the United States 
appeared to have hit a soft patch in 2012, with 
downward revisions in its real GDP growth rates and 
number of jobs created, and only marginal progress 
in curbing unemployment at a time of falling labor 
force participation. In Europe, the euro-zone crisis 
continued to dominate the economic landscape, 
Table 1.1 Global Growth Assumptions* 
Real GDP growth in percent
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012e 2013f 2014f
World 1.4 -2.2 3.9 2.8 2.3 2.6 3.2
High-income countries 0.1 -3.5 2.8 1.6 1.3 1.5 2.2
Developing countries 5.8 1.9 7.3 6.2 5.1 5.6 5.9
East Asia and Pacific 8.5 7.5 9.7 8.2 7.2 7.6 7.5
Europe and Central Asia 3.9 -6.5 5.4 5.6 3.4 3.9 4.6
Latin America and Caribbean 4.0 -1.9 6.1 4.3 3.2 3.9 4.0
Middle East and North Africa 4.1 3.0 4.1 1.5 0.5 1.9 3.4
South Asia 5.9 5.5 8.1 7.3 6.1 6.1 6.8
Sub-Saharan Africa 5.1 1.9 5.0 4.7 4.8 5.2 5.2
Source:  World Bank Global Economic Prospects Group staff estimates 
Note:  e=estimate; f=forecast 
*   As of October 2012
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with growing challenges due partly to continued 
deleveraging efforts, widening bond spreads, and 
declining equities. In Japan, reconstruction spending 
has contributed to a recovery in economic growth in 
2012, but prospects going forward indicate a slower 
rate of expansion in light of the country’s fiscal deficit 
and debt problem. 
In developing countries, real GDP growth is also 
expected to slow in 2012 and increase only mar-
ginally in 2013-2014 (table 1.1). Although continuing 
to grow at rates much higher than for high-income 
economies, developing countries are facing several 
challenges: vulnerability to weak global economic 
growth prospects and curtailed bank lending in high-
income economies; fluctuating commodity prices; 
volatile capital flows; and adverse political devel-
opments. However, for the most part, the danger of 
inflation has subsided. New challenges are emerging 
in China, the developing world’s largest economy, 
as it shifts its focus from an export-oriented to a 
domestic consumption-driven economy. The evo-
lution of the economic and political situation in 
China will impact growth prospects in a number 
of developing countries, particularly commodity-
exporting ones.
The crisis in the euro zone and intensification of 
the region’s recession in 2012 are having important 
effects on today’s intertwined global economy 
through various channels. These include trade, 
banking and financial linkages, FDI and the activities 
of multinational enterprises (MNEs), and workers’ 
remittances. Contagion from the euro-zone crisis is 
playing an important role in the projected slowdown 
in Europe and Central Asia, especially in Southeast 
Europe. With an economy more driven by natural 
resources, the Russian Federation is an exception and 
has maintained elevated real GDP growth projections 
despite its close economic links with Europe. 
Economic growth in the Middle East and North 
Africa—also dependent on Europe for trade and FDI 
and still marred by considerable political uncertainty 
and turmoil—is estimated to have decelerated further 
in 2012 and is now forecast to rebound in 2013. 
Economic growth in East Asia and the Pacific and in 
South Asia is estimated to have also decelerated in 
2012, mainly because of a slowdown in China and 
India. Growth in Latin America and the Caribbean 
slowed down as well, mostly due to a sharp decel-
eration in Brazil. In contrast, sub-Saharan Africa is 
anticipated to continue its recent strong performance 
and maintain an elevated rate of real GDP growth of 
around 5 percent.
In sum, with financial conditions having worsened 
sharply and increased uncertainty, the global 
economy is estimated to have slowed down in 2012, 
and growth rates are expected to remain moderate 
over the next couple of years. At the same time, the 
downside risks to the current growth projections 
have risen, as confidence levels have deteriorated and 
market turmoil persists. While the effects will be felt 
more strongly in high-income countries, developing 
countries will not remain immune to adverse 
economic fall-out. 
Prospects for Private Capital Flows 
to Developing Countries 
Amidst slow and fragile economic growth prospects, 
more stringent regulatory requirements on European 
banks, and intensified deleveraging, capital flows to 
developing countries are estimated to have declined 
in 2012 (figure 1.1). This is following another year of 
decline in 2011. Private capital flows have followed 
the same trend, with volatile portfolio equity inflows 
plummeting in both 2011 and 2012. Private bond 
issuance, mostly by corporate issuers based in 
developing countries, reached a record level in the first 
four months of 2012 and is projected to register an 
increase for the year as a whole. FDI continues to be 
the biggest source of private capital into developing 
countries, but this too is estimated to have declined 
in 2012. Official flows (not shown in figure 1.1) from 
multilateral institutions declined following peak 
levels in 2009 and 2010, when they boosted lending 
from multilateral institutions to combat the effects 
of the financial crisis in 2008. Official development 
assistance to developing countries (not shown in 
figure 1.1) declined in 2011 by 2.7 percent (in real 
terms), reaching $134 billion.
Trends and Prospects for FDI
Having risen by 27 percent to $1.9 trillion in 2011, 
driven primarily by cross-border mergers and acqui-
sitions and rebounding growth during the first 
half of that year, global FDI inflows declined to an 
estimated $1.7 trillion in 2012. Restrained optimism 
in the second half of 2011, more subdued cross-
border merger and acquisition activity, and curtailed 
lending all contributed to the decline. FDI inflows to 
developing countries are estimated to have declined 
by 7 percent in 2012 compared to the previous 
year. A variety of factors contributed to the decline, 
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Figure 1.1 Net Private Capital Flows 
to Developing Countries
$ billion and percent
Source: World Bank
e=estimate; f=forecast 
including concerns over spillover effects from the 
sovereign debt crisis in Europe, deleveraging and 
reduced bank lending (especially by banks from 
high-income economies, which continue to be the 
biggest source of FDI for the developing world), 
and increased economic uncertainty. Developing 
countries accounted for an estimated 36 percent of 
global FDI in 2012. 
In 2011, high-income economies were at the forefront 
of the increase in FDI inflows on account of a sharp 
rise in cross-border mergers and acquisitions,1 and 
together received $1.3 trillion. That year, developing 
economies saw a 10 percent increase in FDI, alto-
gether receiving $639 billion, or 34 percent of global 
FDI inflows. In 2011, the picture for FDI inflows 
was mixed, driven by a strong rebound in growth in 
the first half of the year and a sense that the global 
economy could be on a sustained path to recovery. 
The Middle East and North Africa experienced the 
largest decline in light of the political turmoil, while 
the biggest increase was in Europe and Central Asia, 
where FDI had been severely affected by the 2008 
financial crisis and recession in Western Europe. 
In 2012, FDI inflows to both high-income and 
developing countries contracted as prospects for 
sustained recovery became more fragile. FDI inflows 
into developing countries fell to an estimated $594 
billion (36 percent of the global total), a decline 
felt across all regions except Latin America and the 
Caribbean, where there was a marginal increase. For 
the largest recipients of FDI in the developing world—
Brazil, the Russian Federation, India, and China (the 
BRICs)—FDI inflows remained mostly flat in 2011, 
with China leading the way with inflows totaling about 
$220 billion. Together the BRICs accounted for about 
three-fifths of FDI inflows to developing countries in 
2011, a share in line with their proportion of nominal 
developing-country GDP. Low-income economies 
accounted for an estimated 3.2 percent—a share that 
has been rising slowly over the past few years and is in 
line with their portion of developing-country GDP. 
FDI inflows into developing countries in the Middle 
East and North Africa declined marginally in 2012, 
following a sharp decline in 2011 (figure 1.2). FDI in 
the region remains subdued and well below the levels 
reached prior to the onset of the Arab Spring events, 
mostly due to ongoing political instability and uncer-
tainty and weakened investor confidence. In Tunisia, 
FDI inflows declined by 14 percent in 2011, while 
inflows to Egypt recorded a net divestment (outflow) 
of $483 million in the same year. The picture 
emerging in 2012 is quite diverse: countries with 
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Figure 1.2 Net FDI Inflows to 
Developing Countries by Region
$ billion and percent
Source: World Bank
e=estimate; f=forecast
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
4.5
 0
 100
 200
 300
 400
 500
 600
 700
 800
 900
20
0
4
20
0
5
20
0
6
20
0
7
20
0
8
20
0
9
20
10
20
11
20
12
e
20
13
f
20
14
f
Fig 1.2
Sub-Saharan Africa
South Asia
Middle East and North Africa
Latin America and Caribbean
Europe and Central Asia
East Asia and Pacific
Share of GDP (right axis)
continued political instability, uncertainty, or conflict 
are seeing FDI inflows plummet, while countries with 
relative stability are seeing investor confidence return 
and are experiencing strong rebounds.2 Indeed, a 
return to stability and reduced uncertainty would con-
tribute to FDI inflows rising quickly to the pre-turmoil 
levels (see Spotlight on the Middle East and North 
Africa on page 24).
FDI inflows into South Asia declined sharply in 
2012 by an estimated 27 percent, having risen by 18 
percent the previous year. The increase in 2011 was 
attributed to more investment flowing into India, the 
region’s largest recipient, in response to the ongoing 
but gradual liberalization of the country’s investment 
policy, some large cross-border acquisitions of Indian 
firms, and increases in FDI in the services, chemicals, 
and pharmaceuticals sectors.3 FDI into South Asia is 
projected to rebound strongly over the next two years. 
FDI inflows to East Asia and the Pacific declined mar-
ginally by an estimated 5 percent in 2012, following 
another small decline in 2011 as inflows into China, the 
region’s principal recipient, moderated. The slowdown 
in China is partly attributed to spending constraints 
facing investors in high-income economies and mod-
erating global demand, negatively affecting manu-
facturing FDI. While inflows into China may adjust 
permanently to levels below their peak, overall FDI for 
East Asia and the Pacific is projected to increase over 
the next two years.
FDI inflows into sub-Saharan Africa have been on an 
upward path over the past decade. On average, they 
have risen from $13 billion annually during 2000-2005 
to $28 billion annually during 2006-2010, and are 
projected to increase to $38 billion annually during 
2011-2014. FDI inflows declined following the financial 
crisis, but posted a 34 percent increase in 2011 to $36 
billion. However, they are estimated to have declined 
again in 2012, partly due to the adverse economic 
environment in Europe, historically an important 
source of investment, and worse FDI performances 
in selected key recipient countries. Over the next 
couple of years, FDI is projected to reach new record 
levels, underscoring the region’s expected high 
growth as investors seek to take advantage of attractive 
returns in frontier economies, growing consumer 
markets, and abundant natural resources.
Europe and Central Asia’s close links with euro-zone 
members has meant that economies there continue 
to be adversely affected by the sovereign debt crisis 
and liquidity problems. FDI inflows declined by an 
estimated 7 percent in 2012, following an increase 
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of 35 percent in 2011. The increase in 2011 was 
driven by natural resource-seeking investors into 
Central Asia, who helped to boost FDI inflows into 
the Russian Federation, while doubling them into 
kazakhstan. In Turkey, FDI inflows shot up in 2011, 
and may well remain elevated in 2012, considering 
that flows in the first quarter of this year were mar-
ginally higher than in the same period in 2011.4 In 
Southeast Europe, where FDI is heavily dependent 
on the euro-zone periphery countries, FDI inflows in 
2011 were a third of their peak level reached prior to 
the 2008 financial crisis. Deleveraging by European 
banks, which has curtailed lending by their affiliates 
in the region, led to the introduction of the vienna 
2.0 Initiative aimed at ensuring orderly credit con-
ditions in the region.5 
The Latin America and the Caribbean region was 
somewhat of a bright spot. FDI inflows into the 
region are estimated to be marginally higher in 2012, 
following a 26 percent increase in 2011. This was 
despite moderating growth prospects, deteriorating 
economic conditions in key FDI source countries in 
the euro zone, and concerns over elevated political 
risks in select countries. Although growth slowed sig-
nificantly, FDI inflows into Brazil—the region’s largest 
FDI recipient—increased by a third in 2011, attracted 
by the country’s long-term growth potential, the size 
of its domestic market, and natural resources. Over 
the next year, flows into the region are projected 
continue to increase sharply. 
For 2013, FDI inflows to developing countries are 
projected to rebound by 17 percent to $697 billion, as 
global economic growth is anticipated to accelerate 
modestly. In the longer term, sustained higher 
economic growth in developing countries compared 
with high-income economies, a large and growing 
consumer base, the availability of natural resources, 
and ongoing improvements in investment climates 
will continue to improve the attractiveness of 
developing countries as investment destinations.
MIGA-EIU Political Risk Survey 2012
The anticipated rebound in investment is corrob-
orated by the findings of the MIGA-EIU Political Risk 
Survey 2012 (appendix 2). Now in its fourth year, the 
2012 survey gauged the investment intentions of 438 
mostly large MNEs with global annual revenues of at 
least $500 million. The survey, carried out in August 
and September of 2012, asked MNEs about their 
plans to invest in developing countries over the next 
12 months (compared with the previous 12 months) 
and over the next three years (compared with the 
previous three years). 
Overall, MNEs remain relatively optimistic, with 
half of the respondents expressing the intention to 
increase investment in developing countries over 
the next 12 months, despite the challenges detailed 
in this report (figure 1.3). Even though growth 
prospects in developing countries have also become 
subdued, these countries are still projected to grow 
about twice as fast as high-income economies. The 
expanding market size implied by the higher growth 
rates continues to improve developing countries’ 
attractiveness to foreign investors, especially when 
compared with relatively stagnant markets at 
home. Importantly, one third of the surveyed MNE 
respondents remain cautious; the uncertainty sur-
rounding the global economy is prompting them 
to adopt a “wait-and-see” attitude and leave their 
investment plans unchanged or on hold over the next 
12 months. A significant minority of the responding 
MNEs (13 percent) expressed the intention of 
reducing investments in developing countries.
Similar to the findings of previous MIGA-EIU Political 
Risk Surveys, MNEs are more optimistic over the 
medium term compared with the short term as 
seen by responses on investment intentions over 
the next twelve months compared with investment 
intentions over the next three years (figure 1.3). The 
share of MNEs that intend to expand into developing 
countries in the following three years jumps to 70 
percent compared with 52 percent in the short term, 
with only 11 percent of them planning to decrease 
investments over the medium term. The share 
of MNEs that continue to adopt a “wait-and-see” 
approach over the next three years more than halved 
to 15 percent from those with a cautious stance 
over the next year. Clearly, MNEs expect the current 
economic uncertainty to decline in the medium term, 
thus removing one of the reasons that has held back 
additional investment flows. 
Other surveys reinforce these findings. The 2012 
A.T. kearney Foreign Direct Investment Confidence 
Index6 (based on a survey conducted during July-
October 2011) confirmed that investors are finding 
developing countries to be promising, particularly 
owing to their large and growing consumer markets, 
and are assigning high priority to them as investment 
destinations. However, FDI inflows to developing 
countries may be dampened by uncertainty in the 
near term regarding the speed of economic recovery 
and possible downside risks. 
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UNCTAD’s World Investment Prospects Survey 
2012-20147 (based on respondents from 174 MNEs 
and 62 investment promotion agencies during 
February and May of 2012) supported the findings 
of investor cautiousness for 2012 and greater 
optimism for investing overseas over the next  
two years.
FDI Outflows from  
Developing Countries
Uninterrupted by the slowdown in the global 
economy, FDI outflows originating in developing 
countries increased by an estimated 11 percent in 
2012 to reach a new record level of $237 billion, or 
one percent of their combined GDP (figure 1.4). Since 
FDI outflows from high-income economies declined 
because of a sharp fall in cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions, developing countries’ share of global 
FDI outflows increased to an estimated 14 percent. 
In line with their share of developing country GDP, 
the BRICs accounted once more for the lion’s share: 
an estimated 64 percent of FDI outflows from all 
developing countries. The acceleration of developing 
countries’ investment overseas—especially from 
China, but also from Brazil, which has a longer 
history of investing abroad—began in the middle 
of the last decade. This has been in pursuit of their 
quest to access new markets, natural resources, and 
technological and management know-how. 
FDI outflows from the BRICs increased marginally 
by an estimated 3 percent in 2012 as MNEs from 
these countries continued to forge ahead with their 
overseas investment plans. China’s outflows are 
estimated to have reached a new record level in 2012, 
having declined in 2011. Chinese MNEs, mostly state-
owned enterprises, sought to acquire stakes in com-
panies based in both high-income and developing 
countries,8 and continued investing in greenfield 
projects in the developing world. China continued 
to reinforce its policy of “going global,”9 targeting 
a greater balance between inward and outward FDI 
over the medium term by encouraging the latter. 
Brazil’s FDI outflows rebounded in 2012 after regis-
tering a net divestment in 2011. Indian MNEs held 
back their overseas investment plans in 2012, with 
estimated FDI outflows declining by nearly two-fifths. 
FDI outflows from the Russian Federation, mostly in 
manufacturing and services, declined by an estimated 
11 percent in 2012 to $60 billion from a record level 
of $67 billion in 2011. 
Other developing countries, notably a small group of 
middle-income or resource-rich economies (Mexico, 
Colombia, Chile, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, 
Turkey, and kazakhstan), also expanded their 
overseas investments, together accounting for 30 
percent of estimated FDI outflows from developing 
countries in 2012.
As corporate sectors become more sophisticated, 
domestic firms become global players, and outward 
investment restrictions become more relaxed, FDI 
outflows from developing countries are expected 
to continue to increase. In the MIGA-EIU Political 
Risk Survey 2012, South-based firms were positive 
about investment prospects in developing countries. 
Some 62 percent of South-based respondents 
conveyed the expectation of investment expansions 
in developing countries over the next three years, 
a smaller proportion than for foreign investors 
overall. Outward investment from China is expected 
to continue growing rapidly as Chinese companies 
seek to become part of international global pro-
duction chains, acquire brands through cross-border 
mergers and acquisitions, and secure natural 
resource supplies.
Political Risks and 
Developing Countries
Strong headwinds facing the world economy, per-
sistent uncertainty emanating principally from devel-
opments in the euro zone, moderating growth, and 
turbulence in financial markets have exacerbated 
foreign investors’ overall concerns regarding gov-
ernment actions that could adversely affect the 
private sector. While, for the most part, developing 
countries continue to introduce measures that 
open up domestic markets to FDI and increase 
transparency for investors,10 a number of adverse 
government actions have amplified concerns about 
political risks. For example:
 r The desire for increased regulation in the 
aftermath of the financial crisis has led to the 
introduction of national and multilateral rules, 
increased capital requirements under Basel III11 
for the banking sector, and Solvency II12 for the 
insurance industry. More generally, regulatory 
changes pertaining to all aspects of a country’s 
investment climate can cause uncertainty and 
contribute to elevated perceptions of political risk. 
In a recent survey whose findings are reported 
in Lloyd’s Risk Index 2011,13 changing legislation 
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Figure 1.4 FDI Outflows from 
Developing Countries
$ billion and percent
Source: World Bank
e=estimate
Figure 1.3 Changes in Foreign 
Investment Plans
Percent of respondents
Source: MIGA-EIU Political Risk Survey 2012
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ranked fifth in importance out of fifty risks related 
to operating an international business.  
 r Expropriation—which was an important threat 
to foreign investors in the developing world 
a few decades ago, but had since abated—is 
becoming more prevalent.14 The number of 
direct expropriations (as opposed to indirect 
and “creeping” expropriations) has been rising 
since the early 2000s.15 Several new direct 
expropriations occurred in 2011-2012, notably 
YPF S.A. in Argentina partly owned by Repsol 
YMP S.A. (Spain) and Transportadora de 
Electricidad, a power transmission company 
in Bolivia owned by Red Electrica Española 
(Spain), and some local companies in Sri 
Lanka. Contract renegotiations and resource 
nationalism in the extractive industries 
continue in developing and some high-income 
countries, driven by commodity prices that 
rebounded quickly following the 2008 financial 
crisis and have remained elevated since, as 
well as the ongoing scramble for resources. 
Several countries have introduced new royalty 
regimes or taxation rules for mining companies 
(for example, in Australia, Ghana, and South 
Africa), or new mining legislation that requires 
increased state participation in the extractive 
industries (as in Guinea and Zambia). In 
Indonesia, new mining regulations require 
foreign investors to divest at least 51 percent of 
the total equity share to local investors over a 
10 year period. In light of these developments, 
it is not surprising that a recent survey by Ernst 
& Young found resource nationalism to be the 
most important business risk facing the metals 
and mining sector in 2011-2012.16 
 r Political violence and unrest have been on the 
rise. Besides damage to assets and business 
interruption, political violence can lead to a loss 
of income for investors not directly affected by 
it, as other investments may suffer from loss 
of attraction, as in the case of tourism projects. 
Growing concerns about jobs, social inequality, 
elevated food prices, and non-democratic 
political regimes have given rise to civil distur-
bances and political violence, often leading to 
property damage and business interruptions. 
This had been accentuated by risk contagion, 
where changes in the risk profile in one country 
can be easily transmitted and affect the risk 
profile of others. 
 
 r While increased government involvement in 
the private sector had been viewed as nec-
essary at the height of the financial crisis, 
the understanding was that it would be a 
temporary measure to be reversed at a later 
date. Governments have been winding down 
their involvement in private sector companies, 
though some increased presence remains. 
While this was a concern at the initial phases 
of the government involvement, the MIGA-EIU 
Political Risk Survey 2012 found that only a small 
minority of respondents now consider this to be 
a constraint to investing in developing countries. 
The implications of these trends are profound for 
the international production used by many MNEs. 
Such production is characterized by interconnected 
regional and global supply chains to which political 
events can cause significant disruptions and costly 
delays because no particular location carries large 
inventory to sustain a downturn elsewhere. In 
Allianz’s ranking of the top 10 business risks based 
on a worldwide survey of risk management profes-
sionals, politically determined business interruption 
was second.17 The concern in the business com-
munity about disruption in the global economy 
owing to political risk is also evidenced in the World 
Economic Forum’s Global Confidence Index, which 
finds a high likelihood of such disruption over the 
next 12 months.
From a longer-term perspective, political risks are 
intertwined and likely to be aggravated by a number 
of global trends. These include rapid population 
growth coupled with high shares of youth popu-
lations and few jobs in developing countries, growing 
income inequalities, urbanization, water and food 
supply crises, rising demand for arable land and finite 
natural resources, volatile commodity prices, poor 
governance, chronic fiscal imbalances, and the like-
lihood of prolonged austerity.18 Together with more 
widely accessible information and communication 
technologies, these factors and others can influence 
political risks and impact corporate investment 
patterns in turn. 
Corporate Perceptions of Political 
Risks in Developing Countries
The MIGA-EIU Political Risk Survey 2012 sought to 
gauge the principal constraints to FDI in developing 
countries over the next 12 months and over the next 
three years (figure 1.5). Although concerns about 
MIGA WIPR REPORT 2012   |  21   
Figure 1.5 Ranking of the most 
Important Constraints for FDI in 
Developing Countries
Percent of respondents
Source: MIGA-EIU Political Risk Survey 2012
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political risks remain elevated, it is the persistent 
fragility and instability of the global economy, the 
slow rate of recovery since the 2008 financial crisis 
coupled with significant downside risks, and the 
ongoing deleveraging that feature as the most 
prominent constraints to FDI. As a result, over the 
next 12 months, macroeconomic instability and 
access to financing rank in the two top places among 
the concerns of corporate investors. The weakness 
of the global economy and difficulties in accessing 
financing continue to take precedence over political 
risks and structural constraints such as infrastructure 
capacity and access to qualified staff in developing 
countries. This suggests that political risks tend to 
become more important concerns for investors only 
insofar as the macroeconomic environment is benign 
and funds are easily accessible. It also suggests that, 
since growth rates of the global economy and high-
income countries in particular are expected to remain 
subdued at least over the next year, this ranking of 
constraints is not likely to change significantly. 
Although the three-year ranking (figure 1.5) confirms 
the persistent concern of investors about the state 
of the global economy and difficulties in accessing 
finance, political risk rises to the top of the list of 
constraints as the most important obstacle for 
investing in developing countries. This highlights 
the strong impact that political risk has on the 
investment decision-making process such that it 
overshadows the effects of economic weaknesses 
around the world. The fact that this ranking of 
political risk matches the findings of previous 
MIGA-EIU Political Risk Surveys suggests that 
investors are very cognizant of its presence and view 
it as a long-term obstacle. 
According to the MIGA-EIU Political Risk Survey 2012, 
adverse regulatory activity within developing countries 
topped investors’ concerns among different types of 
political risks (figure 1.6). Regulatory risk—essentially 
the risks posed by uncertainty regarding regulations 
or changes in regulations—has risen in importance 
since the first MIGA-EIU Political Risk Survey in 
2009. As in 2011, a greater proportion of investors 
ranked this risk in top place, followed by breach of 
contract and transfer or convertibility restrictions. 
For the majority of foreign investors, political risks 
have not forced them to cancel or withdraw existing 
investments (figure 1.7). In line with the findings of 
the earlier surveys, only a minority of investors have 
been driven to do so because of perceived political 
risk. Nevertheless, for some types of risks such as 
regulatory risk and breach of contract, just over a 
quarter of respondents had to cancel or withdraw 
investments. This finding is consistent with his-
torical data on claims payment by the political risk 
insurance industry, which indicate that the largest 
amount of claims paid out to investors is based 
upon expropriation or breach of contract (see chapter 
three). Additionally, these types of events tend to be 
highly publicized. The majority of respondents in the 
survey listed breach of contract and regulatory risks 
as those accounting for the largest amount of losses 
over the past three years (figure 1.8). Thus, risk per-
ception and claims data of the political risk insurance 
industry correspond very closely in terms of the types 
of political risks that have the greatest impact on 
foreign investors. 
Spotlight on South-South FDI
As of 2010, MNEs from developing countries had 
amassed a stock of overseas FDI valued at some 
$1.2 trillion,19 72 percent of which was attributed 
to the BRICs. Developing countries often invest in 
other developing countries to take advantage of 
cultural links, political ties, knowledge of market con-
ditions, and familiarity with institutional qualities in 
countries in near proximity. Examples include MNEs 
based in Latin America (for example Argentina, 
Chile, Colombia, and Mexico), that have acquired 
or invested in manufacturing and financial services 
firms in neighboring countries20 and companies 
based in Asia that have been driving the growth of 
intra-regional investment flows.21 
As of 2010, the outward stock of South-South 
FDI(excluding investment channeled through inter-
mediate jurisdictions) was valued at $302 billion. 
About 56 percent of that stock was accounted for 
by the BRICs.22 The Russian Federation, China, 
South Africa, Malaysia, and Mexico ranked in the 
top five places in terms of the share of South-South 
investments in their total outward FDI stocks (figure 
1.9). Much of that investment is intra-regional: 
two-thirds of the Russian Federation’s FDI stock 
in developing countries is in Europe and Central 
Asia (although, as mentioned above, this trend 
changed noticeably in 2011); just over half of South 
Africa’s stock in developing countries is in sub-
Saharan Africa; and virtually all of Mexico’s stock 
in developing countries is in Latin America and the 
Caribbean.  
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Figure 1.8 Proportion of Firms that 
have Suffered Losses Owing to 
Political Risk over the Past Three 
Years
Percent of respondents
Source:  MIGA-EIU Political Risk Survey 2012
Note:  Percentages add up to more than 100 percent 
because of multiple selections
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into the Middle East and North Africa do not plan 
to change in their current (low) or planned levels of 
investments in both Arab Spring countries and in the 
rest of the region (figure 1.12). On a more positive 
note, 14 percent of respondents plan to invest in 
Arab Spring countries, a share that is the same as for 
the rest of the region. These findings highlight that 
political and economic instability have taken a toll on 
the region’s investment prospects, especially in the 
Arab Spring countries, and investors appear likely to 
continue with a “wait-and-see” approach before re-
engaging. 
The MIGA-EIU Political Risk Survey 2012 also sought 
to gauge the importance of different factors that 
would induce investors to re-engage in the Middle 
East and North Africa (figure 1.13). Stability—both 
political and economic—scored high, as did better 
governance. However, investors’ re-engagement 
appeared to be driven primarily by the presence of 
investment opportunities. This suggests that despite 
the “wait-and-see” approach adopted by many 
investors, lucrative opportunities could induce them 
to re-enter. 
The high score registered for “one year of political 
stability” suggests that political risk has been an 
important factor in the decision of investors to 
withdraw or not to engage in new investment in the 
Middle East and North Africa. As expected, political 
risk perceptions increased more for the Arab Spring 
countries than for the rest of the countries in the 
region. Political violence, in particular civil dis-
turbance, but also war and terrorism, were the risks 
that registered major increases in negative risk per-
ceptions for the majority of foreign investors. These 
were more pronounced for the Arab Spring countries 
across all political risks (figure 1.14), but they also 
increased in importance for countries in the rest of 
the region. This suggests that, with regard to political 
risk perceptions, the ongoing instability in the Arab 
Spring countries has spilled over to the rest of the 
region, with potentially ongoing negative effects on 
investment. 
There are some early signs that in countries where 
political stability is returning and uncertainty is 
abating, FDI prospects are becoming more positive. 
For the Middle East and North Africa overall, FDI 
flows are projected to stay largely flat in 2013 and 
begin to rebound only in 2014. In Tunisia, for 
example, during the first five months of 2012, FDI 
inflows increased by 41 percent compared with the 
same period in 2011.26 The Central Bank of Tunisia 
has forecast FDI inflows in 2012 to reach $2 billion, 
Based on data from greenfield investments alone, 
South-South investment flows began to accelerate in 
the second half of the last decade, coinciding with 
the acceleration of all FDI outflows from developing 
countries. On average, the number of South-South 
projects rose from 590 during 2003-2005 to 996 
during 2009-2011. The value of cross-border 
investments also followed an upward trend, although 
it has yet to recover from its post-financial crisis 
decline (figure 1.10). 
Spotlight on the Middle East  
and North Africa
FDI inflows into the Middle East and North Africa 
were on an upward path during the past decade, but 
declined initially due to the 2008 financial crisis and 
subsequently in the aftermath of the political turmoil 
that began at the end of 2010. Data from greenfield 
investments show that the decline was dramatic: in 
2008 capital expenditures in cross-border greenfield 
investment projects were $116 billion; in 2011 that 
figure was only $11 billion and in the first half of 2012 
it declined further to $2 billion.23 
In 2012, FDI inflows into the region remained 
subdued and well below recent historical levels. For 
many of the region’s economies, dependence on FDI 
from Europe24 has meant that the recession and dele-
veraging in the euro zone continue to adversely affect 
the flow of investment. Developing oil-importing 
economies, which had enjoyed a rapid increase in 
FDI inflows (figure 1.11), saw these plummet because 
of the financial crisis and later due to political insta-
bility, civil disturbance, security challenges, and 
other negative effects stemming from the political 
events that have unfolded in the region. In Egypt, 
for example, FDI inflows reached only $218 million 
during July 2011-March 2012, compared with $2.1 
billion during July 2010-March 2011.25 For developing-
country oil exporters in the region, the increase in 
investment was less steep earlier on, and in fact 
flows have largely remained flat. 
In the short term, the dearth of FDI flows into the 
Middle East and North Africa is likely to continue, 
especially in those countries where there is still 
significant political instability. Nearly 20 percent of 
the foreign investors in the MIGA-EIU Political Risk 
Survey 2012 plan to withdraw existing investments 
from the Arab Spring countries. Around half of that 
share also plan to do so in the rest of the countries 
in the region. However, the majority of investors 
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Figure 1.10  South-South Capital 
Expenditures in Cross-border 
Greenfield Projects*
$ billion and number of projects
Source:  fDi Markets database
*  Capital expenditure (capex) on new projects and 
expansions of existing investments. Capex data 
are not recorded for all projects (total amounts 
reported are based on only projects for which 
figures are recorded)
Figure 1.9  South-South*  
Outward FDI Stock
Percent of total outward stock of reporting country
Source:  IMF 
*  Outward South-South FDI stock of 29 countries 
as reported by the IMF’s Coordinated Direct 
Investment Survey
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the same level as in 2009.27 Countries in the region 
are also implementing new measures to attract 
investment, as well as measures to enhance the con-
tribution of FDI to the local economy. For example, 
Libya issued a decree in May 2012 allowing foreign 
firms to enter into joint ventures with local firms 
while requiring them to set up and carry out training 
programs for their local workforce to facilitate the 
transfer of know-how and skills.28 Tunisia is drafting 
a new investment incentives code aimed at boosting 
the contribution of foreign investment to employment 
and regional balance.29 However, for the region as 
a whole, uncertainty remains about the longer-term 
effects of ongoing political and economic instability 
on investment. 
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Figure 1.11 FDI inflows into  
the Middle East and North Africa
$ million
Source:  World Bank
Note: Oil importers: Djibouti, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, 
Morocco, Tunisia
 Oil exporters: Algeria, Islamic Republic of Iran, 
Syrian Arab Republic, Yemen  
Data for Iraq and Libya are not available
Figure 1.12 How Have the 
Developments in the Arab World 
over the Past Year Affected your 
Current and Future Plans for 
Investments in the Middle East and 
North Africa?
Percent of respondents
Source:  MIGA-EIU Political Risk Survey 2012
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Figure 1.13 Primary Reasons for 
Investing More, or Reinvesting, in 
the Middle East and North Africa
Percent of respondents
Source:  MIGA-EIU Political Risk Survey 2012
Figure 1.14 Increase* in Perceived 
Political Risks on Account of the 
Political Turmoil in the Middle East 
and North Africa
Percent of respondents
Source:  MIGA-EIU Political Risk Survey 2012
*  Major or minor increase
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CHAPTER TWO
SOvEREIGN DEFAULT AND EXPROPRIATION
 
 r As uncertainty remains elevated because of the global economic 
slowdown and continued political instability, both sovereign default 
risk and other political risks (in particular expropriation) remain sig-
nificant issues for foreign investors deciding their investment plans. 
 r This chapter looks at the links between sovereign default and expro-
priation. It presents the finding that—over longer time horizons—sov-
ereign default and expopriation are likely to occur in a similar set of 
countries. However, sovereign default and expropriation are different in 
nature and rarely occur in the same year.
 r The determinants of sovereign default and expropriation differ. While 
political regimes marked by poor governance and under the control of 
political parties conventionally described as “left-wing” explain a higher 
likelihood of expropriations, transitory economic shocks and debt 
burdens tend to better predict sovereign default. 
 r Expropriation is more likely to happen multiple times in countries that 
have expropriated private assets in the past, whereas sovereign default 
is a less persistent event.
 r From a historical perspective, sovereign default and expropriation have 
occurred in waves and are usually associated with a shift of a country’s 
external liability position. Based on trends in the international 
investment position of countries since 2000, developing economies 
seem to have higher risks of expropriation compared to sovereign 
defaults given the composition of their external liabilities. 
 r Despite differences in the determinants of sovereign default and 
expropriation, foreign investors in the MIGA-EIU Political Risk Survey 
2012 are more likely to identify them as related. In this sense, political 
risk insurance (PRI) coverage for sovereign credit risk could poten-
tially have a positive spillover effect to alleviate broader political risk 
concerns.
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This chapter offers an empirical analysis of the 
relationship between sovereign default and expro-
priation over a long and a short time horizon, by 
using data from 1970-2004.30 Additionally, it looks 
at how investors perceive these risks and how this 
might differ from the observed reality.  
Currently, there is a growing demand for political 
risk cover for non-honoring of sovereign or sub-
sovereign financial payments. This is a reflection 
of the constrained financing environment following 
the 2008 global financial crisis. A key conclusion 
of the last four MIGA-EIU Political Risk Surveys is 
that “macroeconomic instability” is a top short-term 
concern for cross-border investors in developing 
countries. However, “political risk” remains a larger 
structural concern for foreign investors in the 
medium term.
MIGA’s World Investment and Political Risk 2011 
report highlighted that the political regime of a 
host country is the major driver of expropriation, 
which is a key risk concern for investors in many 
developing countries. Moreover, as discussed in 
that report, an adverse economic shock, such as the 
Asian financial crisis in 1998, raised the number of 
investment disputes and increased expropriation 
losses. In terms of sovereign default risk, there is 
rich empirical literature that outlines how sovereign 
defaults are caused by negative economic shocks,31 
macroeconomic factors,32 and institutional quality.33 
However, the causes of expropriation are less 
explored. In previous studies, kobrin34 found 
that the likelihood of expropriation is explained 
by economic shocks, the size of foreign direct 
investment (FDI), and the sector concentration of 
FDI. Li35 looked at political factors such as chief 
executive turnover and political regime type. Guriev 
et al.36 studied higher oil prices and weak political 
institutions as determinants of expropriation in 
oil-exporting countries. The only major study that 
looks directly at the relationship between sovereign 
default and expropriation is by Tomz and Wright.37 
There has been little academic research on how the 
determinants of these two events differ from each 
other. This is particularly important because the risk 
of loss for insurers is materially different for the two 
broad branches of PRI coverage—traditional con-
fiscation, expropriation, and nationalization covers 
and the broader coverage related to non-honoring 
of sovereign financial obligations, which deals with 
sovereign default risk. While the private market has 
been offering non-honoring coverage for a long 
time, public PRI providers have only recently begun 
to offer this coverage.
Analysis in later sections will show that sovereign 
default and expropriation are different in nature, but 
finds several systematic patterns for understanding 
the relative risk of the two events occurring. The 
MIGA-EIU Political Risk Survey 2012 also provides 
corporate-level evidence about how multinational 
enterprises (MNEs) perceive the correlation 
between sovereign default risk and political risk 
when they make investment decisions. 
Historical Trends of Sovereign 
Default and Expropriation
There was a large spike of expropriation events 
for investors from the United States in the 1970s, 
followed by an increase in sovereign default events 
in the 1980s, as shown in the upper panel of figure 
2.1. Defaults were more common during the global 
depression of the 1930s and during the economic 
crises in developing countries in the 1980s. Such 
historical patterns of expropriation events is also 
confirmed based on the Berne Union’s PRI claim 
payments to investors outside of the United States 
over 1971-2011, as shown in the bottom panel of 
figure 2.1.38 The claim payments are clustered in the 
1970s and late 2000s. The trend of expropriation 
events is consistent between two the different data 
sources. 
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Figure 2.1 History of Sovereign 
Default and Expropriation
Source: Berne Union
As discussed in World Investment and Political Risk 
2011, events of expropriation reached historical 
peaks in the 1960s and 1970s. In these decades, 
two distinct processes were converging. On the 
one hand, FDI was a greater proportion of foreign 
capital transactions compared to portfolio investment 
or debt securities; on the other hand, the period 
coincided with the post-colonial emergence of new 
nations eager to assert greater national control over 
economic activity. As such, the number of outright 
nationalizations by host governments was par-
ticularly high. Furthermore, in the aftermath of some 
developing-country revolutions (for example, Bolivia 
in 1952, Cuba in 1959, The Congo in 1960, Indonesia 
in 1964, Chile in 1970, Iran in 1979), developing 
countries saw an increase in political pressures that 
supported government takeovers. During this time 
period, nearly two thousand expropriations occurred 
worldwide, and a significant portion of FDI origi-
nating in high-income countries was lost. 
However, expropriation cases declined dramatically 
for the 15 years after 1980 as FDI levels reached 
a plateau. By the early 1990s, with the so-called 
Washington Consensus in full swing and the state-
centric development model in decline, there was a 
growing sense that expropriations were a thing of 
the past. In the second half of the 1990s, a backlash 
against the Washington Consensus accompanied 
by incomplete deregulation of domestic markets 
and transitions in political systems led to a higher 
incidence of expropriation cases. These expropri-
ations were clustered in Latin America and Central 
and Eastern Europe. However, they were no longer 
predominantly associated with widespread national-
izations (although there were still a few such cases), 
but mostly associated with contractual disputes over 
regulated sectors of the economy (that is, regulatory-
type risks). Public utilities, such as power and water, 
were the most affected by governments reneging on 
commitments. It was the period between these two 
expropriation waves (the major one in 1970s and 
the minor one after 1996) that was characterized by 
a high incidence of sovereign defaults, to the point 
that the 1980s are remembered as the decade of the 
“developing-country debt crisis.” 
These historical trends indicate that both expro-
priations and sovereign defaults tend to be clustered, 
but they do not tend to occur in parallel; in fact they 
rarely occur in the same year. There were only five 
cases among a total of 5,360 (for the pooled obser-
vations of 191 countries over the 1970-2004 period) 
when these two events coincided in a single year in 
the same country (see upper panel of table 2.1). 
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Sovereign default events are less persistent, partly 
because it is technically difficult for a country to 
default consecutively on its debt obligations—since 
default involves action against all debts and there 
tends to be no additional outstanding debt on 
which to default after the first wave of defaults has 
taken place. Sovereign defaults typically coincide 
with adverse economic conditions, such as shocks 
to commodity prices and interest rates and have 
been sensitive to the global capital flow cycle.39 
However, expropriation events are found to be more 
persistent over time, partly because such events 
are specific to certain strategic sectors (such as 
water or energy) and they are clustered in specific 
countries. Expropriation tends to be sectoral and 
it is rare to find cases of wholesale nationalization 
of private enterprises. While this raises the risk of 
expropriation in other sectors of the economy (in 
fact, this is the main indicator that foreign investors 
look at in assessing political risk, according to the 
MIGA-EIU Political Risk Surveys), it does not follow 
that all foreign assets will necessarily be subject to 
government takeover.
Despite the lack of correlation between expro-
priation and sovereign default in the short term, it 
is instructive to further investigate why these two 
events seem to arrive in waves. One hypothesis by 
Tomz and Wright is that the two events are related, 
with certain time lags that are distinct to each type 
of event and specifically to the changing compo-
sition of the country’s external liabilities. In other 
words, the composition of foreign investments, that 
is, the weight between debt and equity, has been 
altered in a systematic manner. For example, in 
the decades following the spike of expropriation in 
the 1970s, countries relied more on debt financing, 
culminating in the debt crisis of the 1980s. After 
the economic crises of 1980s, developing countries 
broadly lost their access to capital markets, partly 
in response to this, direct investment and equity 
investment reemerged as a major financing source 
for developing countries. An interesting exception 
would be a case where sovereign default and expro-
priation coincided, as was the case in Indonesia 
with the 1998 Asian financial crisis. As highlighted 
in Box 2.1, 40 there were immediate drops in debt 
flows and FDI inflows after 1998. However, in this 
exceptional context, the weight between debt and 
equity recovered to the pre-crisis level after the debt 
crisis ended. Despite such exceptions, the historical 
evidence suggests that a country’s external liability 
position can be useful in assessing the host country’s 
relative riskiness to sovereign default.  
Table 2.1 Joint Distribution 
of Sovereign Default and 
Expropriation Events
Pooled Observations (1970-2004)
No  
expropriation
Expropriation Total
No 
default
4,967 275 5,242
Default 113 5 118
Total 5,080 280 5,360
Per-country Observations (1970-2004)
No  
expropriation
Expropriation Total
No 
default
75 34 109
Default 20 62 82
Total 95 96 191
Source:  Eden, Kraay, and Qian (2012)
Note: The upper panel considers 5,360 pooled 
observations of 191 countries during this time 
period. The lower panel observes those same 
191 countries, highlighting where either event 
occurred during this time period.
Figure 2.2 shows a recent shift of external liability 
positions (that is, the change in FDI and portfolio 
investment flows consisting of debt and equity 
financing) for advanced economies versus developing 
economies41 and shows a clear contrast between the 
two. Since the mid-1990s, FDI inflows have increased 
in developing economies, peaking in 2007, while 
new FDI inflows to advanced economies continued 
to shrink. Recently, there has been a clear shift 
toward equity financing developing economies, while 
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Figure 2.2 Changes in International Investment Positions, 1995-2010 
In millions
Source: IMF, balance of payment statistics
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Fig 2.2 b
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high-income economies have relied more on debt 
financing. After the 2008 financial crisis, net debt 
flows for advanced economies dropped sharply, and 
the weight of equity investments (on shares, stocks, 
and participations) has increased dramatically.
This figure also shows that developing countries 
have continued to rely more on FDI and portfolio 
equity liabilities. In the medium term, despite 
the reputational cost of expropriation, the shift 
toward FDI also implies that the “prize” for expro-
priating private assets is getting relatively bigger in 
developing countries. However, in the short term, 
the ongoing sovereign debt crisis in European 
countries is a fresh concern, and the adverse 
spillover impact to developing countries seems to 
be the larger worry for foreign investors. This is 
supported by the MIGA-EIU Political Risk Survey 
2012, which found that macroeconomic instability 
and access to financing are the top constraints for 
foreign investors over the next 12 months, while 
political risks are the prominent concern for them 
over the next three years. 
Which Countries Are Crisis-Prone?
Although defaults and expropriations rarely coincide 
in the same year, they are historically related in 
the sense that the same types of countries seem 
to engage in both over the long term. This section 
gathers the empirical findings of past studies to 
understand the country-specific factors that make the 
two risk events more likely. 
The lower panel of table 2.1 uses the dataset con-
structed by Tomz and Wright (2010), and presents 
a joint distribution of 191 countries showing those 
that experienced sovereign default and expropriation 
events during 1970-2004. Countries in the upper-
left quadrant neither defaulted nor expropriated at 
any point in the time period (75 cases), whereas 
countries in the lower-right quadrant both defaulted 
and expropriated (62 cases). Nearly 70 percent of 
countries occupy one of those two quadrants, versus 
30 percent that experienced only one of the events 
during this time period.  This indicates there is a 
strong positive correlation between the two events in 
the long term.
By looking at the regional distribution of 62 countries 
that experienced both events over 1970-2004, about 
half of the expropriation acts occurred in Africa 
(North and Sub-Saharan) and a third of them in 
Latin America and the Caribbean. The expropriations 
are also clustered in Africa and Latin America in the 
Berne Union data based on self-reported PRI claim 
payments (by year of payment, not year of occurrence 
of the event). Thus, the long-term coincidences of 
the data suggest a real underlying pattern, even 
bearing in mind that one of the major difficulties in 
any empirical analysis of expropriations is the lack of 
reliable and consistent aggregate data. 
In addition to the regional concentrations of expro-
priations, an empirical study (Li 2009) shows that 
the political institutions of the host government 
are correlated with the likelihood of expropriation. 
Another study, commissioned by MIGA42 looked at 
whether two political indicators—the policy envi-
ronment of the country and the country’s political 
ideology (“right-wing” vs. “left-wing,” as defined in 
the same study)—are also important determinants of 
the two events. Using Country Policy and Institutional 
Assessment (CPIA) aggregate scores, a general 
measure of policy soundness developed by the World 
Bank, the study found that countries with lower 
CPIA scores (that is, more challenging governance 
environments) are more likely to expropriate private 
assets, although this relationship becomes statis-
tically insignificant when controlling for other factors. 
The study found a stronger relationship with the gov-
ernment’s political ideology, reinforcing the conven-
tional wisdom that foreign investors who operate in 
countries with governments described as “left-wing” 
need to be more concerned about the risk of expro-
priations. This finding is also consistent with World 
Investment and Political Risk 2011, which found that 
the type of political regime could be a major driver of 
expropriation.  
There is also a tendency that expropriations will 
repeat multiple times, while sovereign defaults 
are much rarer events. Among 78 countries that 
expropriated private assets at least once in this 
time period, about 70 percent experienced expro-
priation two or more times, as shown in the upper 
panel of table 2.2. A country is more likely to have 
expropriation events as the number of past expro-
priation events increases. It suggests the possibility 
of reputational spillovers, leading to the conclusion 
that governments lose incentives to preserve a good 
reputation by honoring their obligations once they 
have revealed themselves to be unreliable. As the 
reputation loss is a critical cost of expropriation, 
governments that have expropriated private assets 
in the past (and have therefore already incurred this 
reputation cost) are more likely to engage in further 
expropriation.
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Public debt levels of most Asian countries 
prior to the 1997-98 financial crisis were 
relatively low. Government debt as a per-
centage of GDP in 1996 for China, India, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
and Thailand were at 16, 69, 23, 41, 47, 
and 4 percent respectively. Out of the six 
countries, only Indonesia experienced a 
sovereign external debt crisis during this 
period. Meanwhile, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
the Philippines, and Thailand suffered 
from currency and banking crises when 
the financial crisis hit the region. This box 
focuses on the case of Indonesia to inves-
tigate the impact, if any, of its sovereign 
external debt restructuring on financial 
flows to the country. This is related to the 
joint retaliation hypothesis raised in Tomz 
and Wright concerning whether the non-
honoring of debt contracts spills over to 
spoil relations with other types of investors. 
If there is cross-retaliation between debt 
and equity contracts, the government will 
be excluded from FDI after the outbreak of 
a sovereign default event. Annual data from 
1981 to 2010 on inflows of debt securities 
and FDI into Indonesia expressed as per-
centages of GDP are displayed in Figure 2.3, 
along with the bar that indicates the onset 
of the debt crisis.
It is clear from the figure that both debt 
and FDI inflows tumbled at the onset of 
the sovereign debt crisis, which in this case 
also coincided with the expropriation events. 
The precipitous drop of debt inflows shows 
that the impact of the debt restructuring 
on debt securities seems more immediate 
compared to FDI inflows. Interestingly, both 
types of capital inflows started to recover 
when Indonesia was still in the midst of the 
debt crisis. Indeed, debt and FDI inflows 
exceeded their pre-crisis levels only two and 
three years, respectively, after the debt crisis 
ended. Undoubtedly, better macroeconomic 
conditions such as the narrowing of fiscal 
deficits and higher yields on domestic 
currency investments during the post-crisis 
period acted as pull factors that attracted 
capital flows into the country. Nonetheless, 
the quick recovery of debt and FDI inflows 
suggests that the retaliation was modest 
and does not support the joint retaliation 
hypothesis. It attests to the short-term 
memory of foreign creditors and investors 
as regards the sovereign debt restructuring 
event that took place in Indonesia during 
the financial crisis.
Figure 2.3 Inflows of Debt 
Securities and FDI
Box 2.1  Impact of Sovereign Debt Restructuring 
 on Financial Flows: The Case of Indonesia
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The case of sovereign defaults is quite different. 
The bottom panel of Table 2.2 shows that sovereign 
defaults occurred only once or twice in 90 percent of 
the countries. In the MIGA-commissioned empirical 
study, it was found that the country is less likely to 
experience another sovereign default episode if it 
experienced a default in the previous five years. As 
mentioned previously, it is technically difficult for 
a country to consecutively default on its debt obli-
gations, as debt has to be built up again prior to the 
next default opportunity.
This finding on the persistence of expropriations 
provides a good signal for foreign investors that the 
loss probability of expropriation tends to be higher 
for countries that experienced the event in the past.
If sovereign default is a more isolated event, how 
can the risk of sovereign default risk be assessed? 
In the empirical study (Eden, kraay, and Qian 2012), 
which defines sovereign defaults as a country’s 
failure to make required payments to foreign private 
creditors, the sovereign default event coincided 
with idiosyncratic economic shocks. In this regard, 
economic indicators such as higher external debt 
burden and lower real GDP growth are good pre-
dictors of sovereign default. kraay and Nehru 
(2006) also found that sovereign defaults with 
official creditors are determined by the quality of 
policies and institutions, in addition to debt burden 
and economic shocks. 
In summary, sovereign default and expropriation 
have occurred for somewhat different political 
and economic reasons and they are different in 
nature. Expropriations tend to repeat and are more 
determined by political factors. Sovereign defaults 
tend to be determined by temporary economic 
shocks. In the short term, the two events rarely occur 
in parallel. In the long-run perspective, however, the 
relative riskiness of the two types of events can be 
understood by looking at the external liability position 
of the host country.43 This correlation is unique and 
more complex in comparison with a perhaps more 
obvious correlation between sovereign risk and 
transfer/inconvertibility risk (in box 2.2). 
Given that the same countries engage in both sov-
ereign defaults and expropriations in the long term, 
the same country-level expertise that is useful for 
underwriting traditional PRI may also be relevant for 
providing non-honoring of sovereign financial obli-
gations. 
Table 2.2 Frequency of Sovereign 
Defaults and Expropriations over 
1970-2004
Expropriation
Frequency 
of events
Number of 
countries
%
1 24 30.77
2 16 20.51
3 13 16.67
4 10 12.82
5 9 11.54
6 4 5.13
7 1 1.28
8 1 1.28
Total 78 100
Sovereign Defaults
Frequency 
of events
Number of 
countries
%
1 62 70.45
2 19 21.59
3 4 4.55
4 3 3.41
Total 88 100
 
 Note: Among 191 countries in the total sample, 
there are 78 countries with expropriation events 
and 88 countries with sovereign default events 
during this time period.
Source: Tomz and Wright (2010)
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Box 2.2 Sovereign Risk and Transfer/Convertibility Risk
Besides expropriation, a perhaps more 
obvious correlation is that between 
sovereign risk and transfer and convert-
ibility risk. The two risks are highly cor-
related. Based on Standard &Poor’s (S&P) 
ratings on the long-term foreign currency 
(LTFC) and transfer and convertibility as 
of September 2012, a simple correlation 
between the two is 0.83. Figure 2.4 plots 
128 countries with different LTFC rating 
(x-axis) and transfer and convertibility rating 
(y-axis). The fitted line shows this high cor-
relation between these two types of risk.
Historically, sovereigns suffering from 
political and economic pressures have 
tried to safeguard falling foreign reserves 
by restricting the ability of residents to 
convert from local to foreign currency. Fitch 
previously operated a “sovereign ceiling” 
approach, whereby LTFC was automatically 
regarded as the ceiling on the transfer 
and convertibility rating. This is based on 
experiences of sovereign debt crises in the 
1970s and 1980s, when governments facing 
default imposed moratoriums or exchange 
controls and/or took other restrictive 
measures, such as impeding access and 
transfer of foreign currency by private 
entities. 
However, as private capital flows and trade 
have become more globalized, the number 
of countries that impose capital controls 
has decreased dramatically. In addition, the 
experience of sovereign default events since 
the mid-1990s (for example, the Dominican 
Republic in 2005) provides some support 
for the view that governments are less 
likely than in the past to impose foreign 
exchange controls and private-sector mora-
toriums in order to prevent a sovereign 
default. According to Fitch (2004) of the 
12 emerging-market sovereign crises, nine 
resulted in a default but only two resulted 
in some form of transfer and convertibility 
event.45 This makes a simple “sovereign 
ceiling” approach less realistic.
Based on the reduction of transfer and 
convertibility risk relative to sovereign risk, 
rating agencies view transfer and convert-
ibility risk as lower. As a result, the transfer 
and convertibility rating exceeds sovereigns’ 
LTFC ratings in 68 percent of sovereigns 
that are rated by S&P (2009), while another 
32 percent have the same rating for both 
LTFC and transfer and convertibility. In 
figure 2.4, countries with a transfer and 
convertibility rating higher than the LTFC 
rating are plotted above the 45 degree line. 
Countries in monetary or currency unions 
are assigned the same transfer and con-
vertibility rating as other union member 
countries, and dollarized economies have 
the same transfer and convertibility rating 
as the United States.46 In such cases, their 
transfer and convertibility ratings tend to be 
overrated compared with their LTFC rating, 
which weakens the correlation between the 
two risks. 
MIGA WIPR REPORT 2012   |  37   
Figure 2.4 Correlation of  
Sovereign Credit Rating and 
Transfer/Convertibility Rating
Source: Standard & Poor’s
Note: Rating is rescaled in a range of 0-100 in which 
“D” corresponds to 0 and “AAA” corresponds to 
100
In the next section, firm-level observations are 
provided to further analyze this issue based on the 
MIGA-EIU Political Risk Survey 2012, which asked 
how MNEs’ risk perception of political risks change 
in response to future sovereign default events. 
Corporate-level Political Risk 
Perceptions for  
Sovereign Credit Risk 
As discussed in chapter one, in the MIGA-EIU 
Political Risk Survey 2012, macroeconomic instability 
and access to financing emerge as the top two con-
straints for FDI over the next 12 months. It is clear 
that the euro-zone sovereign debt crisis and recent 
financial deleveraging have created severe business 
obstacles for firms and affected corporate-level 
risk perceptions for FDI. Given the weak economic 
conditions in the euro area, the survey further inves-
tigates how the current sovereign debt crisis affects 
firms’ general perceptions on political risks, comple-
menting the country-level analysis in the previous 
sections. 
Based on the survey, it is clear that multinational 
investors perceive traditional political risks (expro-
priation/breach of contract, transfer restriction 
and inconvertibility, and war and civil disturbance) 
as significant, alongside the risk of a sovereign’s 
non-honoring of financial obligation, because of 
current sovereign credit events. Figure 2.5 illus-
trates the answer to the question of how firms’ 
general perception of political risks change due to 
an increase in sovereign risk through events (for 
example, euro-zone sovereign default episodes, debt 
restructuring of the investing country, and com-
modity price shocks). For all political risks, over 50 
percent of firms consider that actual sovereign risk 
events will increase the risk of each political event. 
There is a strong perception that an increase in 
sovereign risk will lead to major increases in war 
and civil disturbance (37 percent of respondents), 
breach of contract (31 percent), transfer and convert-
ibility restrictions (26 percent), and expropriation 
(24 percent). Firms that invest in the Middle East 
and North Africa are especially likely to see higher 
risks that the sovereign crisis could trigger political 
instability, host government’s expropriatory actions, 
and restrictions on foreign exchange. Another inter-
esting finding from the survey is that firms that 
work primarily in the financial sector perceive a 
major rise in political risks due to these sovereign 
Fig 2.4
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credit events. This suggests that foreign banks in 
emerging economies currently face a serious funding 
constraint because of the weak global economy and 
limited funding resources. This tends to make them 
more risk averse and therefore seek risk-mitigation 
instruments more actively than firms in other sectors. 
The MIGA-EIU Political Risk Survey 2012 also asked 
whether changes in sovereign credit rating would 
affect a firm’s business risk of expropriation/breach 
of contract, transfer restriction/inconvertibility, and 
non-honoring of sovereign financial obligations. 
Figure 2.6 shows the results for the first two types of 
political risks. Similar to figure 2.5, over half of firms 
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expressed their concerns about the rise in expro-
priation and contract violation, as well as foreign 
currency transfer restriction in the event sovereign 
debt default should occur. Even under the more 
realistic situations where the sovereign credit rating 
would be downgraded below investment grade, they 
perceive higher risks of both political risk events.
This seems to be somewhat contradictory to the 
country-level evidence, which shows a lack of cor-
relation between actual sovereign default and 
expropriation events in the short term as well as no 
spillover effect between two events. As discussed in 
previous sections, in the past decades there are rarely 
cases where two extreme events (sovereign default 
and expropriation) coincide as shown in table 2.1. 
Although actual events tend not to happen at the 
same time, this firm-level survey makes clear that 
the two events are generally perceived by MNEs as 
strongly correlated in the sample. The survey does 
not explicitly ask the time period over which the 
risk was being assessed, but investors tend to have 
a forward-looking view on political risk, especially 
for expropriation (figure 1.4 and 1.5). If they have 
a longer-time horizon when indicating their per-
ceptions on political risk, this survey result would be 
compatible with long-run evidence that a similar set 
of countries eventually engages in both sovereign 
default and expropriation. 
As investors’ risk perceptions of sovereign default 
are positively correlated with their perceptions of the 
risk of expropriation, this implies that the provision 
of PRI for non-honoring of sovereign financial obli-
gation could have some positive spillover effects 
in mitigating investors’ broader political risk per-
ceptions for FDI. 
Finally, based on the survey, the sensitivity of political 
risk perceptions to sovereign risk seems to be higher 
for specific types of firms—those investing in certain 
countries in the Middle East and North Africa (such 
as Egypt) and Latin America (such as Argentina, 
Brazil, and Mexico). In addition, such region-specific 
responses by firms could be partly explained by 
already-elevated perceptions of political risk after the 
Arab Spring in the Middle East and North Africa, but 
this should also relate to the country typology dis-
cussed in the previous section. Although this requires 
a more systematic analysis, foreign investors’ political 
risk perceptions might be more sensitive to a sov-
ereign crisis in certain countries. As noted in this 
section, investors’ risk perceptions might also be 
more sensitive in countries that face higher con-
tagion risks from the global crisis (for example, due 
Figure 2.5 Impact of Actual  
Sovereign Risk Events on  
Political Risk Perceptions 
Percent of respondents
Source:  MIGA-EIU Political Risk Survey 2012
Note:  In this question, “sovereign risk” includes events 
such as default episodes in euro-zone, debt 
restructuring, and commodity price shocks
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to weak external liability positions), those with poorer 
governance, or countries that experienced multiple 
political risk events in the recent past. These topics 
too need to be the subject of further research.
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Figure 2.6 Sovereign Credit Risk and 
its Impact on Political Risk
Percent of respondents
Source:  MIGA-EIU Political Risk Survey 2012
In conclusion, this chapter examined the empirical 
relationship between sovereign credit risk and 
political risk over time and highlighted some 
empirical regularities between the two types of risk. 
At the country level, it found that the two types of 
events rarely coincide in the short term, but seem 
to occur in waves. Because of the current global 
economic crisis in the advanced economies, foreign 
investors’ political risk perceptions seem to be 
elevated for emerging and developing economies. As 
the emerging economies have relied more on FDI 
as a substantial source of foreign currency in recent 
years, expropriation risk seems to be relatively higher. 
This is in sharp contrast to advanced economies, 
which are perceived to be more susceptible to sov-
ereign debt default risk. Amidst the global economic 
crisis, PRI for sovereign credit risk seems to play a 
role in encouraging investments by managing the risk 
of non-honoring of sovereign financial obligations, 
but it could also alleviate investors’ broader concerns 
for other political risks.
Finally, this chapter suggests that a similar set of 
countries with weak policy environments and gov-
ernments conventionally described as “left-wing” 
have a more persistent risk of expropriation. In 
terms of PRI coverage for expropriation risks, this 
finding suggests that it is important to accumulate 
knowledge of political and economic conditions for a 
similar set of countries that faced a persistent expro-
priation risk in the past. For PRI providers, this infor-
mation is useful for providing traditional political risk 
insurance as well as relevant for providing coverage 
for non-honoring of sovereign financial obligations. 
Major increase
Minor increase 
No impact
Minor decrease 
Major decrease 
Don’t know
 Expropriation/breach of contract
Transfer restriction/inconvertibility
Sovereign
debt downgrade
(staying above
investment grade)
Sovereign
debt downgrade
(below
investment 
grade)
Sovereign 
debt default
Sovereign 
debt upgrade
(staying above 
investment grade)
Sovereign 
debt upgrade
(below 
investment grade)
Sovereign
debt downgrade
(staying above
investment grade)
Sovereign
debt downgrade
(below
investment 
grade)
Sovereign 
debt default
Sovereign 
debt upgrade
(staying above 
investment grade)
Sovereign 
debt upgrade
(below 
investment grade)
0 20 40 60 80 100
0 20 40 60 80 100
Fig 2.6
40   |   MIGA WIPR REPORT 2012
CHAPTER THREE
THE POLITICAL RISk 
INSURANCE INDUSTRY
 r Between 2008 and 2011, issuance of political risk insurance (PRI)47 
has increased by 29 percent for Berne Union members, an increase 
that has exceeded that of foreign direct investment (FDI) flows into 
developing countries over the same time period. However, aggregate 
premium rates have remained remarkably stable. 
 r Capital availability in PRI, just as in other specialty insurance lines, has 
increased over the past four years. This trend is driven mainly by devel-
opments in the broader insurance market and by the growing demand 
for PRI.
 r As a relatively small specialty line, the PRI market is influenced by 
developments in the general (property/casualty) and life insurance 
industry. The capital position of general and life insurers remains 
strong and new capital requirements contemplated by Solvency II 
are expected to be met easily. Premium income in general and in life 
insurance has remained flat.
 r At least partially due to trends in the general insurance market, capital 
has been allocated to specialty lines such as PRI in search of higher 
income. The growth in PRI has involved both public and private pro-
viders, with the proportions of issuance from each roughly stable. In 
the private and Lloyd’s market, capacity has increased 19 percent in the 
first half of 2012, with new providers entering the market and existing 
providers increasing their capacity.
 r Claims have increased sharply over the past two years and have 
tended to be paid out more by private providers than by public ones. 
Reported recoveries from claims paid by both public and private pro-
viders of the Berne Union have been low, though interpretation of this 
is complicated by the unpredictable lag between claim payments and 
recoveries.
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Figure 3.1 PRI by Berne Union 
Members and FDI Flows into 
Developing Countries
Sources: Berne Union Secretariat; World Bank
The PRI industry expanded in 2011 and evidence 
from the first half of 2012 indicates that this trend 
is continuing. The PRI industry, as a specialized 
line of insurance, is affected by the demand for PRI 
itself, as well as by changes in capital availability in 
the broader insurance market. This chapter explores 
both of these trends by first focusing on the potential 
reasons why demand for PRI grew over the past 
four years and then exploring how trends in the 
broader insurance market affected PRI’s availability of 
coverage and pricing. 
In 2011, the members of the Berne Union issued $75 
billion in investment insurance,48 which represented 
an increase of 13 percent over the previous year.49 For 
the first half of 2012, issuance reached $47 billion, 
with trends suggesting that the uptick could well 
continue into the second half of the year. Private PRI 
members outside of the Berne Union have reported 
similar trends, although the exact amount of issuance 
is more difficult to determine because of confiden-
tiality and other legal reasons. 
While volume of new PRI issued by Berne Union 
members in 2011 is over twice the volume issued 
in 2005, this needs to be viewed in the context of 
growing levels of FDI flows into developing countries, 
including FDI from developing countries themselves. 
Despite an upward trend, the rate of growth has 
not been smooth, with a fall-off occurring in 2008. 
However, since 2009, the cumulative growth rate of 
PRI issuance has been greater than that of FDI into 
developing countries (part 2 of figure 3.1). For this 
reason, on average, new PRI as a proportion of FDI 
inflows into developing countries has increased from 
9.5 percent during 2006-2008 to 11.6 percent during 
2009-2011 (part 1 of figure 3.1). Most of this increase 
took place in 2009 in the aftermath of the global 
financial crisis and has remained constant since 
then at 11.6 percent.50 The increase may be a result 
of either higher global political risk perceptions, or 
more capital scarcity in the financial sector (as PRI in 
some cases may relieve capital charges in financial 
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Figure 3.2 PRI Issuance by Berne 
Union Members
$ million
Source: Berne Union Secretariat
institutions), or a combination of both. It should be 
noted that the figures also underscore that the bulk 
of FDI is not covered by PRI.
Demand for PRI
With trends largely pointing to growth in investment 
into developing countries and heightening awareness 
and perceptions of political risk among investors, 
demand for PRI has increased sharply since 2005. 
The year 2011 showed the strongest increase in 
absolute terms since the onset of the financial crisis, 
with new investment insurance issued by members of 
the Berne Union reaching a new record (figure 3.2). 
By the first half of 2012, the Berne Union issuance 
level was still growing strongly and is expected to 
reach an even higher level than in 2011. Issuance for 
the first half of 2012 alone was near the level for the 
full year in 2009 and higher than the level of each 
year prior to 2007.
The main developments driving the demand for PRI 
have been: 
 r Unexpected events in the Middle East and North 
Africa have raised the profile of risks associated 
with seemingly stable regimes. 
 r Expropriations in Latin America and contract 
renegotiations in the mining sector in several 
resource-rich economies over the past few years 
have brought political risk into the forefront of 
investors’ consideration. 
 r Capital constraints and more regulation in 
financial institutions (for example, Basel II-III, 
Solvency II) have limited the financing options 
for foreign investment. PRI may be able to 
mitigate the perceived risks by regulators and 
offer capital relief for financial institutions, which 
makes financing with PRI more attractive.
 r In the financial sector, a drop in demand for PRI 
by banks for shareholder loans to their affiliates 
has been offset by increased demand from 
project finance.
More generally, after a rather benevolent period with 
low levels of political claim losses, there is a growing 
realization that political risk events are not easily 
predictable and can adversely affect FDI projects and 
supply chains.
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The growing demand for PRI is taking place in the 
context of the current financial market turmoil and 
deleveraging by financial institutions in Europe and 
other high-income economies that are facing new 
regulatory requirements to bolster their positions. 
With limited funding available and banks especially 
cautious, PRI for investment projects is in demand to 
enable financing to go forward, particularly to obtain 
capital relief. 
As foreign investors look for higher returns, they 
are turning increasingly to frontier markets where 
political risks can be significant. New actors in the 
field of FDI who are less familiar with developing-
country environments—especially frontier markets—
also look to PRI as a tool to mitigate risks. Demand 
for PRI is increasing from investors interested in 
countries that are beginning to encourage FDI, such 
as Myanmar, or those that have seen a substantial 
influx of investment in recent years, like Mongolia in 
natural resources. Finally, events in the Middle East 
and North Africa contributed to greater awareness 
of the need to manage political risk by underscoring 
that investors are not always in a position to take into 
account unanticipated events in their current risk-
mitigation strategies. 
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Figure 3.3 PRI Issuance by Berne 
Union Members, by Type of Provider
$ million
Source: Berne Union Secretariat
since 2005, while total cover provided by private and 
multilateral providers was more volatile, actually 
declining in some years (figure 3.3). In 2008 and 
2009, the growth in total cover provided by public 
providers increased much faster than for private 
providers that are members of the Berne Union, but 
this trend is reversing. Among investment insurers 
based in developing countries that are members of 
the Berne Union, total cover provided also increased 
considerably in parallel to the growth in outward FDI 
from developing countries.
Anecdotal evidence among public issuers confirms 
this picture of higher than historical growth 
compared to that of private providers, for which 
growth in issuance has not been significantly higher 
than historical trends. These observations, however, 
exclude Lloyd’s market participants, meaning the 
relative growth rates and relative shares of public 
and private issuance may not be as marked as the 
figure suggests. In a July 2012 roundtable of private 
insurers and brokers from the London insurance 
market (Lloyd’s syndicates and other private insurers) 
hosted by the Exporta Group on behalf of MIGA, 
participants noted an increase in demand for PRI 
across all political risks. While noting that regulatory 
requirements such as Solvency II (the revised capital 
requirements and risk-management standards for 
the insurance industry in the European Union) and 
Basel III (a comprehensive set of reform measures 
to strengthen the regulation, supervision, and risk 
management of the banking sector) are increasing 
the cost of insurance, the broad consensus was 
that demand is still strong for both specialized and 
general lines of coverage. In fact, most private market 
participants noted the overall stability in the market 
over the past 20 or so years, in the sense that both 
specialized PRI and broader universal coverage have 
tended to move in parallel. While there have been 
periods when one or another type of coverage has 
been preferred by clients, over the long term the 
relative share of both types of coverage has remained 
broadly constant. In the current period of issuance, 
this growth pattern continues to hold. The expec-
tations of market participants are that demand for 
PRI will continue to increase at rates slightly  
above those for FDI and that, in the near term, the 
Solvency II regulatory requirements will not pose a 
barrier to the pattern of continued growth, at least 
in the PRI market. As an insurance regulator told 
MIGA, the capital position of insurers in the United 
kingdom at this time is significantly stronger than 
what will be required under the new regulatory 
framework, so this should not act as a barrier to 
further growth.
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While the increase in demand for PRI has been 
broad-based, demand (in absolute terms) has been 
particularly strong for investments in Asia. This 
probably reflects the continued growth in infra-
structure projects in the region into 201251 as well 
as attractive opportunities in countries with large 
domestic markets that are also continuing to see 
real GDP growth. However, in relative terms, smaller 
countries have seen a disproportionate rise in PRI 
issuance. An interesting development in the market 
is that—while historically demand for PRI has 
typically been focused on investments in developing 
countries—in the past two years there has been a 
marked increase in inquiries and issuance in some 
high-income countries, reflecting heightened political 
risk perceptions there due to the financial and sov-
ereign debt crisis.
According to the Berne Union, total PRI cover 
provided by public providers increased every year 
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Supply of PRI: 
Capacity, Pricing, and Products
Capacity
In terms of capacity, the private PRI industry appears 
well-positioned to respond to the ongoing rise in 
demand. Arthur J. Gallagher & Co. London brokers 
estimated in their July 2012 market update52 that 
capacity in the private market increased by 24 
percent since July 2011, of which about 19 percent 
represented an increase in the first six months of 
2012 (figure 3.4). Single providers have tended to 
increase available line sizes and tenors. The increase 
in capacity in the private and Lloyd’s markets is 
occurring at tenors of 10 years or less. For 15-year 
tenors, Arthur J. Gallagher & Co. estimates that 
capacity stands at some $440 million. Over the past 
year, it has not only been the expansion of availability 
in the PRI market that has increased capacity, but 
also the entry of new players. XL Group has recently 
received approval from Lloyd’s to underwrite political 
risks and trade credit risks as a Lloyd’s syndicate 
and has also expanded its underwriting capability.53 
Canopius also began underwriting political risks in 
January 2012, and in February 2012, Ironshore Lloyd’s 
Pembroke Syndicate began to offer PRI coverage to 
the United States market.54 
Capacity in the public sector is typically funded by 
governments, and PRI capacity ceilings in many 
public providers can be high. Exogenous factors and 
requirements also shape the supply of public sector 
PRI to investors.55 In the public market, new entrants 
include the Export Insurance Agency of the Russian 
Federation, which will offer investment insurance to 
Russian firms investing abroad starting in 2013.56 
Recently, the African Development Bank approved an 
equity investment into the African Trade Insurance 
Agency allowing it to increase its capital base.57 
To some degree, capacity in the PRI market is also 
driven by the situation of the broader insurance 
market. Over the past couple of decades, insurance 
firms have entered and exited the PRI market—
driven by the dynamics of the broader insurance 
market—adding or subtracting capacity. Therefore, 
it is useful to review some of the broader issues 
affecting the property and casualty insurance industry 
to understand these historical dynamics, since these 
are the business lines typically shifting into the PRI 
market.
Figure 3.4 Available Private Market 
PRI Capacity
Total maximum per risk in $ million
Source: Arthur J. Gallagher & Co. 
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There are two broad trends currently occurring 
in the insurance industry. The first relates to the 
environment facing the property/casualty and life 
insurance markets. While the post-2008 crisis has 
negatively impacted the insurance industry’s income 
in developed countries, the industry appears to be 
on the verge of new growth in developing countries 
where insurance penetration remains relatively low. 
Thus, the future outlook for private capacity in the 
insurance market remains positive. The second 
trend is the new regulatory regime under Solvency 
II and Basel III. As mentioned earlier, in discussions 
MIGA had with insurance regulators in the United 
kingdom and the European Union, it was clearly 
stated that capital adequacy is not a major concern in 
the insurance industry generally. Broadly, most of the 
Solvency II quantitative requirements are in place and 
in these two significant jurisdictions insurance com-
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Figure 3.5 General Insurance 
Pricing vs. Private PRI Capacity
$ million per risk
Sources: Gallagher London; Advisen58 
Note:  The Advisen ADVx™ Composite Commercial 
Lines Pricing Index shows the change in the 
average commercial lines premium in the United 
States by quarter beginning the first quarter of 
2001 (Q4 2000 = 100)
panies are currently well-capitalized. Specialized and 
general and life firms, as well as major reinsurers, 
have concluded that Solvency II requirements are not 
expected to negatively impact capital availability in 
the next few years. Because of these trends, market 
conditions in the broader insurance market are “soft” 
and liquid.59 
An important ongoing concern in the broader 
insurance industry has been the protracted low-
interest environment. Given regulatory limits on 
assets classes allowed for investment, returns 
from investments have remained low by historical 
standards with expectations that the situation will 
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not change in the short term. What this means is 
that financial returns have been falling. One of the 
corporate responses to this has been to shift capital 
into specialized lines, including PRI. This explains to 
a large degree why capacity in PRI has been growing 
at rates above those of FDI flows. 
Pricing
As noted earlier, PRI is often managed as a specialty 
line by general insurance companies, so liquidity 
and pricing of PRI correlate somewhat with the 
insurance market. Further, as the PRI portfolio is 
dwarfed by that of general insurance, the supply 
of PRI also closely follows trends in the insurance 
cycle. Consequently, notwithstanding the very rapid 
growth in demand for PRI, capital supply in this line 
of business has increased equally rapidly leading to 
continued soft premiums. How much insurance pro-
viders in any business segment are willing and able 
to underwrite is also determined by the availability of 
reinsurance, which by all accounts remains strong. 
According to Aon Benfield, reinsurance capacity has 
been ample, returning to its previous record high of 
$470 billion at the end of the first quarter of 2012.60 
Indeed, PRI market capacity and general insurance 
pricing have trended together over the past 10 years 
(figure 3.5). There are several ways to measure the 
softness of the insurance market, including insurance 
pricing indexes and the available amount of policy 
holder surplus (the difference between insurers’ 
assets and liabilities). Figure 3.5 tracks capacity in 
the PRI market since 2001 against Advisen insurance 
consultants’ ADvx composite index of general 
insurance pricing, a pricing benchmark used in the 
insurance industry. 
For 2012, and looking at the same issue in terms 
of year-on-year growth rather than absolute dollar 
figures, Advisen also compared the property and 
casualty policy holder’s surplus growth with GDP 
growth and estimated that policyholders’ surplus is 
still growing ahead of GDP61 and, in fact, ahead of 
historical growth averages. This would indicate that 
the forces contributing to premium softness remain 
in place, and that policyholders’ surplus continues to 
grow to historic highs.
The current soft insurance market has persisted 
throughout the credit crisis. Despite the temporary 
rise in claims in the aftermath of the global financial 
crisis and the political turmoil in the Middle East 
and North Africa, premium levels have remained 
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Figure 3.6 Ratio of Premiums to 
Average PRI Exposure for Berne 
Union Members
Source:  Berne Union Secretariat
Note:  Average rates; weighted average rates are likely 
higher
stable as capacity has increased in both the general 
insurance and PRI markets. Thus the market was 
confronted with the seeming paradox that benign 
insurance market conditions held up despite the 
unfavorable environment in financial markets. It 
is unclear how long the current soft state of the 
global insurance market will persist. If predictions 
of continued sluggish growth in the industrialized 
world materialize, interest rates and investment 
income will likely remain subdued for some time. 
However, lower economic activity will also reduce 
the real demand for insurance services, although 
some product lines may experience growing demand 
in developing countries as insurance penetration 
increases. 
In the PRI market, risk appetite, pricing, and capacity 
will depend as much on loss events outside the 
narrow PRI industry as on financial losses within the 
PRI industry from significant political events. Large 
catastrophe losses, for example, directly influence 
reinsurance availability, requiring private insurers 
to deploy capital across business lines. The PRI 
industry’s supply cycle therefore also depends as 
much on events such as natural disasters as it does 
on political events.
Historically, the ratio of premiums to average PRI 
exposure has fluctuated within a band. Plentiful 
capacity in both the general and PRI markets as well 
as greater flexibility in setting premium rates by pro-
viders in the public market helped to hold premiums 
relatively steady in 2011 (figure 3.6), but it is not 
certain that this will continue. Potentially, the drivers 
of the demand for PRI outlined earlier will exert 
upward pressure on premiums. There are also signs 
that premiums in some risk categories of the broader 
insurance market are increasing,62 which would also 
exert upward pressures on PRI pricing. 
In conclusion, in the private sector, PRI is often a 
specialty line offered by general insurance companies 
and, as such, developments in the PRI market are 
influenced by developments in the broader insurance 
business.63 In recent years, capacity in the general 
insurance market has increased. At the same time, 
demand for insurance has been sluggish because 
of the slow economic recovery following the global 
financial crisis. Insurers’ capital has continued to 
grow to new records and currently there appears to 
be a sufficient supply of reinsurance globally.64 This 
is reflected in the current soft market, though going 
forward, increased demand may drive prices higher.
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The increased risk perception by investors and con-
sequent increase in demand for PRI has resulted 
in innovative ways to use existing products and 
increased product offerings. Some public members 
of the Berne Union (including MIGA) have expanded 
their offering to respond to different investor needs. 
For example, the events in the Middle East and 
North Africa region have engendered an interest 
for coverage of existing investments, despite the 
historical requirement of many public providers to 
cover only new investments. Additionally, the more 
constrained financing environment since 2008 has 
resulted in greater need for sovereign or sub-sov-
ereign support or direct engagement in financing of 
projects. This has led to greater interest in coverage 
of risks such as the non-honoring of sovereign 
financial obligations. Additionally, the growing stress 
on public finances in some parts of the world as a 
result of the crisis has led to an increase in interest 
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by investors in sovereign non-payment insurance. 
The entry of public providers into these product 
markets has permitted an increase in volume as well 
as tenors for these covers.
Overall, risk-mitigation strategies and product 
mixes within the PRI industry have not changed 
dramatically. The increase in PRI issuance in the 
Lloyd’s market this year has not tended to favor any 
particular coverage. Lloyd’s market participants at 
the MIGA-sponsored roundtable in July 2012 exten-
sively discussed the issue of guarantee product mix. 
One of the main conclusions was that the relative 
share of different types of coverage has not changed 
significantly over the past two decades. While in the 
short term there may be an increase of one type of 
coverage—say, non-honoring of sovereign financial 
obligations—over the longer term the relative shares 
of different products have remained broadly constant. 
This impression was reinforced in MIGA’s discussion 
with reinsurers, who tended to see a broad picture 
of the PRI industry. Discussants observed that the 
mix of products may also reflect the relative liquidity 
position of equity investors and financial institutions, 
as both tend to favor different insurance products. 
This would account for short-term differences in the 
mix of PRI products, but over the medium term the 
mix has remained remarkably stable.
Guarantee types have also tended to evolve in a 
somewhat distinct way. On the one hand, events 
such as those in the Middle East and North Africa 
have increased investor interest in some specialized 
lines, like civil unrest and terrorism coverage (box 
3.1) And some investors are expanding the use of 
investment insurance products for assets such as oil 
rigs, mobile equipment, and personal assets.65 A new 
development in the realm of specialized war coverage 
is the emergence of new products covering piracy.66 
On the other hand, there has also been an increase 
in demand for global policies that encompass 
all risks. With uncertainty as to where the next 
political risk “event” will occur, there seems to be an 
increased interest in global PRI coverage. 
Claims and Recoveries
Political risk claims, in terms of value, have shown 
considerable volatility from year to year. They 
increased sharply in 2010 to $312 million and 
declined in 2011 to about $191 million. Claims in 
2011 resulted overwhelmingly from acts of political 
violence (figure 3.7) and were mainly as a result of 
the turmoil in the Middle East and North Africa. 
This represents a significant shift in the pattern up 
until 2010, when most claims were attributed to 
expropriation or breach of contract. To illustrate this, 
during 1995-2010, claims resulting from expropriation 
or breach of contract accounted for 68 percent of 
all claims in terms of amount paid, but the share of 
losses under these coverages was only 5 percent in 
2011. Typically the size of claims for expropriation or 
breach of contract tends to be larger than those for 
political violence because expropriation claims tend 
to be associated with the total loss of an investment, 
while political violence claims reflect replacement or 
repair costs and are only infrequently related to the 
total abandonment of the project. 
Because there are no data available for claims and 
recoveries in the Lloyd’s market, the discussion in 
this section will center on the experience of Berne 
Union members. However, in the yearly roundtable 
that MIGA sponsors, the impression was that the 
claims experience in the Lloyd’s market over the past 
couple of years has mirrored that of the Berne Union, 
although the share of political violence in 2011 was 
not as large.
In contrast to previous years, among Berne Union 
members, private PRI providers bore the brunt of in-
vestment claims in 2010, accounting for 54 percent of 
the total value of investment claims paid by all Berne 
Union members in that year (figure 3.8). That picture 
became less pronounced in 2011, when private pro-
viders were responsible for about 46 percent of Berne 
Union claims for investment insurance. The ratio of 
cumulative claims to cumulative new investment PRI 
from 2005 to the first half of 2012 was 0.15 percent for 
public PRI providers, compared with 0.34 percent for 
private. While claims paid in a particular year are also 
in response to claims registered at any point in the 
past, these ratios indicate that there is some differ-
ence between public and private providers. 
Reported recoveries have been consistently lower 
over the past five years (figure 3.9), but this pattern 
may be due to the unpredictable lag in recovery fol-
lowing a claim. Furthermore, recoveries differ by type 
of claim, with no recoveries typically associated with 
political violence claims. 
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Box 3.1  Terrorism Insurance
Following the events of September 11, 
2001 in the United States, there has been 
increased awareness of the risk of ter-
rorism, which has been accompanied by 
a retrenchment in the private provision 
of insurance for it. In the aftermath 
of September 11th, about 20 countries 
worldwide established terrorism insurance 
schemes as public-private partnerships 
to help insurers offer adequate capacity, 
especially in the case of large-scale terrorist 
events. The aim has been to minimize 
the impact of a withdrawal of terrorism 
insurance on businesses and to protect 
them against losses associated with ter-
rorism and business interruption resulting 
from it.
Terrorism risk is difficult to insure because 
it is not easily measureable and historical 
data may not be relevant. There is a great 
potential for vast losses from large-scale 
terrorist attacks, especially in urban centers, 
which reduces the ability of the private 
sector to offer insurance. This is why a 
public-private insurance partnership can 
help create an insurance system that is 
resilient to the threat of terrorism. 
To date about 20 countries have some 
kind of government-backed terrorism 
insurance scheme in place. These include 
Australia, Austria, France, Germany, India, 
Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland, United 
kingdom, and the United States—among 
others. Most schemes were implemented as 
a temporary measure in response to market 
failure following the September 11th events 
and have been renewed following periodic 
reviews. In some countries (for example, 
Belgium and the United States) insurers are 
required to provide coverage against ter-
rorism, while in others (like Germany and 
the United kingdom) insurer participation is 
voluntary. In the case of the United States, 
the Terrorism Risk Insurance Program 
(Reauthorization Act of 2007), which has 
been extended to December 2014, offers 
up to $100 billion in government-backed 
terrorism coverage to the private sector. 
However, it is limited. Certain forms of 
terrorism are exempted (like nuclear or 
chemical attacks and bioterrorism) and it 
does not apply to international operations 
of companies based in the United States. 
In general, excluding government-sponsored 
terrorism insurance schemes, capacity for 
terrorism insurance remains limited—at 
around $2-3 billion, according to one 
estimate. Recent developments regarding 
the provision of terrorism insurance include 
Denmark’s Terrorism Insurance Act 2010, 
a public-private partnership to provide 
coverage for damages to property, trains, 
cars, and ships caused by nuclear, chemical, 
biological, and radiological terrorist acts; 
Xin, a new insurance consortium launched 
by Amlin, Market, Canopius, and Argenta 
(all Lloyd’s syndicates) to offer terrorism 
insurance to businesses in Asia; and the 
U.S. subsidiary of Bermuda-based insurer 
Ironshore, which is bringing Lloyd’s political 
risk coverage to companies in the United 
States.
Sources: Swiss Re. “The Economic Case for a Private-public Terrorism Insurance Partnership.” 
Insights. March 2007; Terrorism Insurance Act Review 2012 (licensed from the 
Commonwealth of Australia under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Australia License); 
Lloyd’s. “New Terrorism Consortium to Protect Under-insured.” March 26, 2012; Rick Friedl, 
“Ironshore Brings Political, War, and Terrorism Coverage to U.S.” The Royal Gazette, April 
17, 2012; Wells Fargo Insurance Services.“The Terrorism Risk Insurance Act is Set to Expire in 
2014 - What’s Next?” July 2010.
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Corporate Approaches to 
Political Risk Management
This section seeks to explore how investors perceive 
the responsiveness of the PRI industry to their 
risk concerns. Building on the survey responses in 
chapter one on risk perceptions, this section expands 
on the strategies used by investors to manage and 
mitigate political risk. 
According to the MIGA-EIU Political Risk Surveys 
over the past four years, the choice of risk-mitigation 
tools used by foreign investors does not seem to 
have changed radically. Thus, the answer to the 
question of how firms mitigate political risk (figure 
3.10) is not significantly different, even though 
political risks seem to have increased. Over the past 
couple of years the proportion of investors interested 
in PRI has changed only marginally. However, non-
formal tools, such as engagement with host-country 
governments and developing relationships with 
Figure 3.7 Investment Claims Paid by 
Berne Union Members
$ million
Source: Berne Union Secretariat
Figure 3.8 Investment Claims Paid 
by Berne Union Members, by Type of 
Provider
$ million
Source: Berne Union Secretariat
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political leaders, could be becoming less effective as 
relationships and established historical ties weaken. 
This implies that formal tools, such as PRI, could 
become more popular. 
Two of the findings of this chapter—that the same 
risk-mitigation tools and product mix within the PRI 
industry have been used over the past four years 
—may seem puzzling on the surface. If risks have 
increased, why have strategies to deal with them not 
changed dramatically? Partly the answer rests in a 
more disaggregated view (figure 3.11) that allows a 
better understanding of how risks are mitigated by 
different tools.
The picture that emerges from this disaggregated 
view is that for some types of risk, mostly associated 
with political violence, there does not seem to be in 
the view of international investors an effective risk 
mitigating tool. Since some of the increase in risk 
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Figure 3.9 Recoveries by Berne 
Union Members, by Type of Provider
$ million
Source: Berne Union Secretariat
Figure 3.10 Risk Mitigation 
Strategies by Foreign Investors 
in percent
Source: MIGA-EIU Political Risk Survey 2012
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perception is associated with an increase in political 
violence risks, this can explain why PRI’s favorability 
among investors is little changed. However, those 
investors who have purchased PRI cover for political 
violence stand a greater chance of compensation 
should a covered event occur. Given the recent 
unpredictable events in the Middle East and North 
Africa, it is possible that investor perceptions of the 
value of political violence cover may change. For 
breach of contract, engaging with local officials has 
consistently been the preferred strategy of investors 
over the past four years. Given the rise in regu-
latory takings, it is reasonable to assume that this 
will remain the case. However, risk of expropriation 
presents an opportunity for the PRI industry, given 
that investors see PRI as being relatively effective in 
controlling that risk (figure 3.11). 
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Figure 3.11 Investors Risk 
Mitigation Strategies, by Risk Type
Source: MIGA-EIU Political Risk Survey 2012 
In summary, the past four years would appear to 
have been good years for the PRI industry. The 
industry’s countercyclical nature has been on display 
in terms of the return of higher risk perceptions 
among foreign investors and financial institutions. 
This has permitted a four-year increase of 29 percent 
in issuance,67 leading to an aggregate increase in 
portfolio. While premium rates have remained soft, 
in aggregate terms, premium income has increased 
because of increased volume. The availability of 
capital in the broader commercial insurance market 
has meant that more has been available to support 
specialized insurance lines such as political risk. 
Therefore, even though issuance has grown rapidly 
and a somewhat higher proportion of new FDI is 
being insured compared to five years ago, the soft 
premium environment in PRI persists at least in the 
short term. Furthermore, as non-life insurance seems 
poised to grow in developing countries, it may yet be 
that policyholders’ surplus will continue increasing 
from its record levels, thus further perpetuating these 
price levels. Although there have not been sufficient 
losses in PRI to date to alter this general picture, 
caution is needed since political risks—real, as well 
as perceived—remain significant. 
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national organization and community for the global 
export credit and investment insurance industry.
39 Carmen Reinhart and kenneth Rogoff. This Time 
is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly. 
Princeton University Press. 2009. 
40 This box is prepared in collaboration with Chow 
Hwee kwan, Singapore Management University.
41 The group categorization of advanced economy and 
emerging and developing economy aligns with the 
IMF’s World Economic Outlook. The definition is 
found on the website (http://www.imf.org/external/
pubs/ft/weo/2012/01/weodata/groups.htm).
42 Eden, kraay, and Qian. “Sovereign Defaults and 
Expropriations: Empirical Regularities.” World Bank 
Policy Research Working Paper #6218. 2012.
43 Net FDI flow includes direct foreign investment 
flows (inward minus outward investment) and net 
re-invested earnings. Net debt investment is the 
net portfolio investment of debt securities, such as 
bonds, notes, and money market instruments.
44 This chapter focuses on the sovereign default event 
and does not consider the sub-sovereign default 
event. According to Moody’s (2009), sub-sovereign 
defaults rates are found to be heavily concentrated 
during the first two years of sovereign crisis in the 
emerging markets. Given this evidence, we expect 
that sub-sovereign default event is similarly cor-
related with the country’s expropriation events. 
45 During 1998-1999 Russian crisis, the government 
tightened capital controls and imposed a formal 
90-day moratorium on servicing external debt. 
Also, during Argentina’s financial crisis in 2001, 
the central bank was very selective in granting per-
mission to transfer foreign currency and imposed 
exchange control regulations.
(cont’d)
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46 Transfer and convertibility of monetary or currency 
union members are rated based on the past 
and current policy soundness of those union’s 
monetary authorities. For example, all members 
of the European Economic and Monetary Union 
have a transfer and convertibility rating of “AAA.” 
All members of the Central African Economic and 
Monetary Community, the West African Economic 
and Monetary Union , and the Eastern Caribbean 
Currency Union have “BBB-”. Transfer and con-
vertibility ratings for dollarized economies are the 
same as those for the United States (for example, 
Panama is rated “AAA”).
47 For the purposes of this report, PRI refers to 
investment insurance.
48 Investment insurance figures are for both 
developing and high-income economies and might 
include business that does not fit into any other 
category.
49 This figure includes a large amount of issuance in 
2009 to support Japanese investor activities in the 
United States at that time. 
50 It is important to realize that this figure understates 
the actual level of PRI coverage as it only refers to 
Berne Union members who report PRI issuance. 
However, MIGA’s consultations with Lloyd’s market 
participants (the major private player, whose 
activities and figures are not reported in Berne 
Union data) and underwriters have confirmed that 
the trends the Berne Union faces are similar to the 
ones they face. So while the actual amount of FDI 
covered may be somewhat higher (estimates place 
it between the 16 percent and 18 percent) the story 
of issuance growth and level of coverage remains 
valid.
51 Marsh. “U.S. Insurance Market Report 2012: 
Political Risk and Structured Credit.” February 2012.
52 Gallagher London. Credit and Political Risk – PRI 
Report and Market Update. July 2012.
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55 For an extensive discussion of the drivers of 
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market, see Gerald T. West and kristofer Hamel, 
“Whither the Political Risk Insurance Industry?”, 
in Theodore H. Moran and Gerald T. West, eds. 
International Political Risk Management: Looking to 
the Future (Washington, DC: World Bank). 
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market.
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Appendix 1 FDI Inflows, 2004–2011 
$ billion 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
World 767 1,175 1,565 2,320 1,924 1,366 1,500 1,904
Developed countries 551 869 1,167 1,761 1,287 938 917 1,265
Developing countries 216 307 398 559 637 428 583 639
 
Latin America and 
the Caribbean  66.8  74.8  74.4  126.4  137.2  84.9  125.3  158.3 
Argentina  4.12  5.27  5.54  6.47  9.73  4.02  7.06  7.08 
Brazil  18.17  15.46  19.38  44.58  50.72  31.48  53.34  71.54 
Chile  7.17  6.98  7.30  12.53  15.15  12.89  15.37  17.30 
Colombia  3.02  10.25  6.66  9.49  10.18  7.14  6.90  13.23 
Costa Rica  0.79  0.86  1.47  1.90  2.08  1.35  1.47  2.18 
Dominican Republic  0.91  1.12  1.53  2.25  2.73  1.70  2.09  2.30 
Mexico  24.83  24.41  20.12  31.49  27.14  16.12  20.71  19.55 
Nicaragua  0.25  0.24  0.29  0.38  0.63  0.43  0.51  0.97 
Panama  1.02  1.10  2.94  2.02  2.53  1.09  2.18  3.26 
Peru  1.60  2.58  3.47  5.49  6.92  6.43  8.45  8.23 
Uruguay  0.33  0.83  1.51  1.36  2.14  1.60  2.19  2.18 
venezuela, R.B. de  1.48  2.71  0.20  2.59  0.41  (3.05)  0.78  5.32 
East Asia and the Pacific  77.6  129.1  153.0  196.4  211.2  154.5  290.0  274.9 
China  62.11  104.11  124.08  156.25  171.53  131.06  243.70  220.14 
Indonesia  1.90  8.34  4.91  6.93  9.32  4.88  13.77  18.16 
Malaysia  4.62  3.92  7.69  9.07  7.57  0.11  9.17  10.78 
Philippines  0.69  1.66  2.71  3.25  1.44  2.71  1.64  1.87 
Thailand  5.86  8.06  9.45  11.33  8.54  4.85  9.68  9.52 
vietnam  1.61  1.95  2.40  6.70  9.58  7.60  8.00  7.43 
South Asia  7.8  10.9  25.8  32.4  50.8  39.3  30.4  35.7 
Bangladesh  0.45  0.81  0.70  0.65  1.01  0.73  0.92  0.80 
India  5.77  7.27  20.03  25.23  43.41  35.58  26.50  32.19 
Pakistan  1.12  2.20  4.27  5.59  5.44  2.34  2.02  1.31 
Sri Lanka  0.23  0.27  0.48  0.60  0.75  0.40  0.48  0.96 
Source: World Bank 
Note: Figures in parentheses represent negative numbers
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Appendix 1 FDI Inflows, 2004–2011 (cont’d) 
$ billion 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Europe and Central Asia  42.6  55.8  101.3  148.4  169.0  90.4  88.0  118.7 
Azerbaijan  3.56  4.48  4.49  4.36  3.99  2.90  3.35  4.49 
Belarus  0.16  0.31  0.36  1.81  2.19  1.88  1.39  4.00 
Bulgaria  2.66  4.10  7.87  13.88  10.30  3.90  1.94  1.98 
Georgia  0.49  0.45  1.17  1.88  1.59  0.65  0.87  1.15 
kazakhstan  4.16  2.55  7.61  11.97  16.82  14.28  6.63  13.23 
Romania  6.44  6.87  11.45  10.29  13.85  4.93  3.20  3.04 
Russian Federation  15.44  12.89  29.70  55.07  75.00  36.50  43.29  52.88 
Serbia  1.03  2.05  4.97  3.43  3.00  1.94  1.34  2.70 
Turkey  2.79  10.03  20.19  22.05  19.50  8.41  9.04  15.87 
Turkmenistan  0.35  0.42  0.73  0.86  1.28  4.55  3.63  3.19 
Ukraine  1.72  7.81  5.60  10.19  10.70  4.77  6.45  7.21 
Uzbekistan  0.18  0.19  0.17  0.71  0.71  0.84  1.63  1.40 
Middle East and  
North Africa
 9.7  16.9  27.3  28.1  29.6  26.3  22.3  15.4 
Algeria  0.88  1.16  1.84  1.83  2.68  3.05  2.33  2.72 
Egypt, Arab Rep.  1.25  5.38  10.04  11.58  9.49  6.71  6.39  (0.48)
Iran, Islamic Rep.  2.86  3.14  1.65  2.01  1.91  3.05  3.65  4.15 
Jordan  0.94  1.98  3.54  2.62  2.83  2.41  1.65  1.47 
Lebanon  1.90  2.62  2.67  3.38  4.33  4.80  4.28  3.48 
Morocco  0.79  1.67  2.46  2.83  2.47  1.97  1.24  2.52 
Syrian Arab Republic  0.28  0.50  0.66  1.24  1.47  2.57  1.47  1.06 
Tunisia  0.59  0.71  3.24  1.52  2.60  1.53  1.33  1.14 
Sub-Saharan Africa  11.4  19.1  16.1  27.8  39.1  32.5  26.7  35.7 
Angola  1.45  (1.30)  (0.04)  (0.89)  1.68  2.21  (3.23)  (5.58)
Botswana  0.75  0.49  0.75  0.65  0.90  0.82  0.26  0.59 
Chad  0.47  (0.10)  (0.28)  (0.07)  0.23  1.11  1.94  1.85 
Congo, Dem. Rep.  0.41  0.17  0.24  1.79  1.67  (0.28)  2.73  1.60 
Congo, Rep.  (0.01)  0.80  1.49  2.64  2.53  1.86  2.21  2.93 
Ghana  0.14  0.14  0.64  1.38  2.71  2.37  2.53  3.22 
Liberia  0.08  0.08  0.11  0.13  0.28  0.13  0.45  0.51 
Madagascar  0.05  0.09  0.29  0.77  1.17  1.07  0.86  0.91 
Mozambique  0.24  0.12  0.19  0.42  0.56  0.90  1.01  2.08 
Niger  0.03  0.05  0.04  0.10  0.28  0.63  0.94  1.01 
Nigeria  1.87  4.98  4.85  6.03  8.20  8.55  6.05  8.84 
Seychelles  0.04  0.09  0.15  0.13  0.13  0.12  0.17  0.14 
South Africa  0.70  6.52  (0.18)  5.74  9.64  5.35  1.22  5.72 
Sudan  1.51  2.30  3.53  2.43  2.60  1.82  2.06  1.94 
Tanzania  0.44  0.94  0.40  0.58  1.38  0.95  1.02  1.10 
Uganda  0.30  0.38  0.64  0.79  0.73  0.84  0.54  0.80 
Zambia  0.39  0.36  0.62  1.32  0.94  0.69  1.73  1.98 
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Question 1. In which country are you personally located? 
Percent of respondents 
1. In which country are you personally located?
Question 1
United States
United Kingdom
Canada
India
Italy
Germany
Spain
China
Singapore
Switzerland
France
Russian Federation
Turkey
Australia
Belgium
Finland
Portugal
Denmark
Hong Kong, SAR China
Netherlands
0 5 10 15 20 25
Others: Poland, Greece, Malaysia, Nigeria, Sweden, United Arab 
Emirates, Austria, Czech Republic, Ireland, Japan, South Africa, 
Angola, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Croatia, Cyprus, Egypt, Hungary, 
Indonesia, Kenya, Oman, Pakistan, Peru, Romania, Saudi Arabia, 
Slovenia, Tanzania, Thailand, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Belarus, Brunei 
Darussalam, Bulgaria, Ecuador, Estonia, Gibraltar, Guadeloupe, 
Islamic Republic of Iran, Isle of Man, Kazakhstan, Malawi, Malta, 
Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, Norway, Paraguay, Sri Lanka, 
Ukraine, Vietnam
Appendix 2  MIGA-EIU Political Risk Survey 2012
The data provided herein are based on a survey conducted on behalf of MIGA by the Economist Intelligence 
Unit (EIU). The survey, which was carried out in July/August 2012, contains the responses of 438 senior exec-
utives from multinational enterprises investing in developing countries. Quota sampling was used to ensure 
that the industry and geographic composition of the survey sample approximates the composition of actual 
FDI outflows to developing countries: following a first round of responses to the questionnaire, additional 
email campaigns targeting respondents in specific industries or geographic locations were conducted until all 
demographic quotas were met. For some questions, percentages add up to more than 100 percent because of 
multiple selections.
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2. What is your primary industry?
Financial sector
Business activities
Other services
Mining, quarrying, and petroleum
Utilities, transport, storage, and communications
Food, beverages, and tobacco
Electrical and electronic equipment
Other manufacturing
Electricity, gas, and water
Machinery and equipment
Chemicals and chemical products
Construction
Rubber and plastic products
Metals and metal products
Agriculture, hunting, forestry, and fishing
Health and social services
Motor vehicles and other transport equipment
Trade
Hotels and restaurants
Education
Wood and wood products
Textiles, clothing, and leather
Coke, petroleum products, and nuclear fuel
Public administration and defense
Community, social, and personal service activities
Publishing, printing, and reproduction of recorded media
Precision instruments
Non-metallic mineral products
0 10 20 30 40 50
Question 2. What is your primary industry?
Percent of respondents
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3. What are your organisation’s global 
annual revenues in US dollars?  
$500m or less
$500m to $1bn
$1bn to $5bn
$5bn to $10bn
$10bn or more
0 10 20 30 40 50
Question 3. What are your organization’s global annual revenues?
Percent of respondents
Question 4a. In which region is your company headquarters located?
Percent of respondents
In which region is your company headquarters 
located?  
Western Europe
North America
Asia-Pacific
Middle East and Africa
Eastern Europe
Latin America
0 10 20 30 40 50
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Question 4b. In which country is your company headquarters located? 
Percent of respondents
In which region is your company headquarters 
located?  
United States
United Kingdom
Canada
Germany
India
Italy
Switzerland
France
Spain
Netherlands
Singapore
Belgium
Sweden
Denmark
Finland
Portugal
China
Hong Kong, SAR China
Japan
Malaysia
0 5 10 15 20 25
Others: Russian Federation, Australia, Greece, United Arab Emirates, 
Austria, Chile, Cyprus, Ireland, Poland, Turkey, Brazil, Croatia, Czech 
Republic, Indonesia, Islamic Republic of Iran, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, 
Pakistan, Romania, South Africa, Algeria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Belarus, 
British Virgin Islands, Brunei Darussalam, Cape Verde, Ecuador, 
Estonia, Isle of Man, Israel, Jamaica, Kenya, Luxembourg, Malta, 
Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Peru, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, Slovenia, 
Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Thailand
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6. What are your main functional roles? Choose up to three.  
General management
Strategy and business development
Finance
Risk
Operations and production
Marketing and sales
IT
Information and research
Customer service
Legal
R&D
Supply-chain management
Procurement
Human resources
Other
0 10 20 30 40 50
5. Which of the following best describes your job title
Board member
CEO/President/Managing director
CFO/Treasurer/Comptroller
CIO/Technology director
Other C-level executive
SVP/VP/Director
Head of business unit
Head of department
Manager
Other
0 10 20 30 40 50
Question 5. Which of the following best describes your job title?
Percent of respondents
Question 6. What are your main functional roles? Choose up to three.
Percent of respondents
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7. In which developing countries is your firm presently investing?  
China
India
Brazil
Russian Federation
Turkey
Mexico
South Africa
Indonesia
Vietnam
Thailand
Malaysia
Argentina
Philippines
Chile
Ukraine
Saudi Arabia
Romania
Colombia
Egypt, Arab Rep.
Nigeria
Peru
Kazakhstan
Pakistan
Bulgaria
Serbia
Ghana
Tanzania
Morocco
Kuwait
Algeria
Bahrain
Tunisia
Others*
0 10 20 30 40 50
* Others receiving five or more responses include: Iraq, Jordan, Angola, Bangladesh, 
Cambodia, Lebanon, Uruguay, Oman, Dominican Republic, Georgia, Guatemala, 
Panama, Lithuania, Belarus, Costa Rica, Jamaica, Albania, Honduras, Montenegro, 
Turkmenistan, Uganda, Bosnia and Herzegovina, El Salvador, Democratic Republic 
of Congo, Sudan, Uzbekistan, Armenia, Islamic Republic of Iran, Zambia, Yemen, 
Republic of Congo, Syrian Arab Republic, Madagascar
Question 7. In which developing countries is your firm presently 
investing? 
Percent of respondents
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Question 8. In your opinion, which of the following factors in the next 12 
months and in the next three years will pose the greatest constraint on 
investments by your company in developing countries? 
Percent of respondentsQ8 on constraints to FDI rankings
0 10 20 30 40
 12 months
Macroeconomic instability
Access to financing
Access to qualified staff
Political risk
Infrastructure capacity
Limited market opportunities
Corruption
Increased government regulation
in the aftermath of the global financial crisis
Other
0 10 20 30 40
three years
Political risk
Macroeconomic instability
Access to qualified staff
Access to financing
Corruption
Infrastructure capacity
Limited market
opportunities
Increased government regulation
in the aftermath of the global financial crisis
Other
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Question 9b. How do you expect your company’s planned investments in 
emerging markets to change over the next three years compared with the 
previous three years?  
Percent of respondents
9b. How do you expect your company’s planned investments in emerging markets to change over 
the next three years compared with the previous three years?  
Increase substantially
(increase 20% or more)
Increase moderately
(increase more than 1% but less than 20%)
Stay unchanged
Decrease moderately
(decrease more than 1% but less than 20%)
Decrease substantially (decrease 20% or more)
Don’t know
0 10 20 30 40 50
Question 9a. How do you expect your company’s planned investments in 
emerging markets to change this year compared with last year?  
Percent of respondents
9a. How do you expect your company’s planned invest ents in emerging markets to change this 
year compared with last year?  
0 10 20 30 40 50
Increase substantially
(increase 20% or more)
Increase moderately
(increase more than 1% but less than 20%)
Stay unchanged
Decrease moderately
(decrease more than 1% but less than 20%)
Decrease substantially (decrease 20% or more)
Don’t know
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Question 10. In your opinion, which types of political risk are of most 
concern to your company when investing in emerging markets in the next 
12 months and in the next three years? 
Percent of respondents
10a. In your opinion, which types of political risk are of most concern to your company when 
investing in emerging markets in the next twelve months? Select up to three.
12 months
Adverse regulatory changes
Breach of contract
Transfer and convertibility restrictions
Civil disturbance
Non-honoring of government guarantees
Expropriation/nationalization
Terrorism
War
0 20 40 60 80 100
three years
Adverse regulatory changes
Breach of contract
Transfer and convertibility restrictions
Civil disturbance
Non-honoring of government guarantees
Expropriation/nationalization
Terrorism
War
0 20 40 60
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Question 11. In your opinion, in the developing countries where your 
firm invests presently, how do each of the risks listed below affect your 
company? 
Percent of respondents
11. In your opinion, in the developing countries where your firm 
invests presently, how do each of the risks listed below affect your 
company? Rate each risk on a scale of 1 to 5 where 1=Very high 
impact and 5=No impact
Transfer and convertibility restrictions
Breach of contract
Non-honoring of government guarantees
Expropriation/nationalization
Adverse regulatory changes
War
Terrorism
Civil disturbance
0 20 40 60 80 100
1 (Very high impact)
2 
3 
4 
5 (No impact)
68   |   MIGA WIPR REPORT 2012
Question 12. In the past three years has your company experienced 
financial losses due to any of the following risks? 
Percent of respondents
12. In the past 3 years has your company experienced financial 
losses due to any of the following risks? Select all that apply. 
 
Breach of contract
Adverse regulatory changes
Transfer and convertibility restrictions
Civil disturbance
Non-honoring of government guarantees
Expropriation/nationalization
War
Terrorism
0 10 20 30 40 50
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Question 13. To your knowledge, have any of the following risks caused 
your company to withdraw an existing investment or cancel planned 
investments over the past 12 months?
Percent of respondents
13. To your knowledge, have any of the following risks caused your 
company to withdraw an existing investment or cancel planned 
investments over the past 12 months? Select one answer for each 
risk. 
Transfer and convertibility restrictions
Breach of contract
Non-honoring of government guarantees
Expropriation/nationalization
Adverse regulatory changes
War
Terrorism
Civil disturbance
0 20 40 60 80 100
1 (Very high impact)
2 
3 
4 
5 (No impact)
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Question 14. What tools/mechanisms does your company use to mitigate 
political risk when investing in developing countries? Select all that 
apply.
Percent of respondents14. What tools / mechanisms does your company use to mitigate political risk when investing in 
developing countries? Select all that apply.  
Use of joint venture or alliance with local company
Political/economic risk analysis
Invested gradually while developing familiarity with the local environment
Use of third-party consultants
Scenario planning
Engagement with local communities
Engagement with government in host country
Develop close relationships with political leaders
Political risk insurance
Operational hedging (setting up multiple plants to spread risk)
Engagement with non-governmental organizations
Credit default swaps
Provide support to a well-connected political figure
Other
We don’t use any tools or products to mitigate political risk
Don’t know
0 20 40 60
MIGA WIPR REPORT 2012   |  71   
Question 15. In your opinion, in the countries where your company invests, 
what are the most effective tools/mechanisms available to your firm for 
alleviating each of the following risks?      
Percent of respondents
15. In your opinion, in the countries where your company invests, 
what are the most effective tools / mechanisms available to your 
firm for alleviating each of the following risks? Select one tool 
for each risk.     
   
Transfer and convertibility restrictions
Breach of contract
Non-honoring of government guarantees
Expropriation/nationalization
Adverse regulatory changes
War
Terrorism
Civil disturbance
Other
0 20 40 60 80 100
Engage with local public entities 
Joint venture with local enterprises 
Risk analysis/monitor 
Relationships with key political leaders 
Political risk insurance 
Risk is not significant for my projects 
No existing tool can alleviate this risk
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Question 16. How would the following events affect your business’s risk 
of expropriation/breach of contract?
Percent of respondents
16. How would the following events affect your business’s risk of 
expropriation/breach of contract?     
     
Sovereign debt downgrade
(staying above investment grade)
Sovereign debt downgrade
(below investment grade)
Sovereign debt default
Sovereign debt upgrade
(staying above investment grade)
Sovereign debt upgrade
(below investment grade)
0 20 40 60 80 100
Major increase
Minor increase
No impact
Minor decrease
Major decrease
Don't know
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Question 17. How would the following events affect your business’s risk 
of transfer restrictions/inconvertibility?
Percent of respondents
17. How would the following events affect your business’s risk of 
transfer restrictions/inconvertibility?     
  
Sovereign debt downgrade
(staying above investment grade)
Sovereign debt downgrade
(below investment grade)
Sovereign debt default
Sovereign debt upgrade 
(staying above investment grade)
Sovereign debt upgrade 
(below investment grade)
0 20 40 60 80 100
Major increase
Minor increase
No impact
Minor decrease
Major decrease
Don't know
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Question 18. How would the following events affect your business’s risk 
of non-honoring of sovereign financial obligations? 
Percent of respondents
18. How would the following events affect your business’s risk of 
non-honouring sovereign financial obligations?    
   
0 20 40 60 80 100
Sovereign debt downgrade
(staying above investment grade)
Sovereign debt downgrade
(below investment grade)
Sovereign debt default
Sovereign debt upgrade 
(staying above investment grade)
Sovereign debt upgrade 
(below investment grade)
Major increase
Minor increase
No impact
Minor decrease
Major decrease
Don't know
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Question 19. How does an increase in sovereign risk through other events 
(such as default episodes in euro zone, debt restructuring, commodity 
price shocks, etc.) affect your perception of the following political risks? 
When sovereign risk increases through other events (such as default 
episodes in euro-zone, debt restructuring, commodity price shocks, etc.), 
how does it generally affect your perception of risk in each of the fol-
lowing areas?       
Percent of respondents
19. How does an increase in sovereign risk through other events (eg, 
default episodes in euro-zone, debt restructuring, commodity price shocks, 
etc,) affect your perception of the following political risks? When sover-
eign risk increases through other events (eg, default episodes in euro-
zone, debt restructuring, commodity price shocks, etc,), how does it 
generally affect your perception of risk in each of the following areas?  
     
Expropriation
Breach of contract
Transfer and convertibility restrictions
War and civil disturbance
0 20 40 60 80 100
Major increase
Minor increase
No impact
Minor decrease
Major decrease
Don't know
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Question 20. How have the developments in the Arab World over the past 
year affected your current and future plans for investments in the Middle 
East and North Africa region?
Percent of respondents
20. How have the developments in the Arab World over the past year 
affected your current and future plans for investments in the 
Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region? Select one for each 
Current investments:
Arab Spring countries
Current investments:
All other Middle East
and North Africa
Planned/future investments:
Arab Spring countries
Planned/future investments:
All other Middle East
and North Africa
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Question 21a. How have the developments in the Arab World over the past 
year changed your perception of the following types of political risk in 
the Arab Spring countries?  
Percent of respondents
21a
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Question 21b. How have the developments in the Arab World over the past 
year changed your perception of the following types of political risk in 
the Middle East and North African region? - All other Middle East and 
North African Countries 
Percent of respondents
21b
in percentage
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Question 22. Which of the following would be your primary reason for 
investing more or reinvesting in the Middle East and North Africa?
Percent of respondents
22
Increased market
opportunities
One year of 
political stability
Improved
macroeconomic stability
Decrease in corruption
More favorable
gov't regulations
Increased access to
financing
Improved
infrastructure capacity
Increased access to
qualified staff
Other
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Appendix 3  Overview of the PRI Market
The PRI market includes three broad categories of providers and covers both export or trade credit and 
investment insurance. For the purposes of this report, PRI refers to investment insurance. The public PRI 
market comprises both national and multilateral PRI providers. The private market’s PRI falls into two main 
categories: (i) political risk activities similar to those of public and multilateral insurers, such as coverage for 
investments in developing countries against expropriation, political violence, and other such risks; and (ii) 
developing-country non-payment insurance covering contract frustration and default by governments. 
Public PRI Providers: They comprise national export credit agencies and investment insurance entities. They 
focus on cross-border trade and investment, generally for constituents in their own countries. 
Multilaterals: These include the African Trade Insurance Agency, the Asian Development Bank, the Inter-
American Development Bank, the Inter-Arab Investment Guarantee Corporation, the Islamic Corporation for the 
Insurance of Investments and Export Credit, and MIGA. The World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and the 
Inter-American Development Bank also provide risk-mitigation instruments, such as partial risk guarantees.a
Private PRI Providers: The majority of private insurers are based in three insurance centers—London, Bermuda, 
and the United States (primarily New York City)—and several of the larger insurers have offices in Singapore; 
Hong kong SAR, China; and Australia (Sydney), among other places. As well as traditional PRI for equity 
investment, the private market offers protection for a wide variety of payment risks in developing countries, 
either for political perils alone, or comprehensive non-payment cover. Brokers play an important role in pro-
moting and sourcing PRI for the private market. This market segment is dynamic: over the past year, some 
players have exited the PRI market, while new entrants have appeared. 
The Reinsurers: Reinsurance companies write PRI-related coverage for both trade and investment. Reinsurance 
is an underlying factor driving both pricing and capacity in the private market. Some of the top reinsurers 
include Munich Re and Hannover Re of Germany, Swiss Re of Switzerland, and Berkshire Hathaway/General Re 
of the United States. Export credit agencies and multilaterals also participate as reinsurers of PRI, although on a 
smaller scale.
The Berne Union: The Berne Union was founded in 1934 in order to promote international acceptance of 
sound principles in export credit and investment insurance and to exchange information relating to these 
activities. Today, the Berne Union has 86 members, including Prague Club members, comprising mainly 
export credit agencies, multilateral organizations, and private insurers. 
The Berne Union plays an important role in bringing together the public and private insurers to enhance coop-
eration and information sharing. Members meet on a regular basis to discuss industry trends and challenges. 
In recent years, there has been a concerted effort on the part of the Berne Union Secretariat to promote trans-
parency and disclosure in the industry and to represent member interests in order to promote global trade and 
investment.
Lloyd’s: An insurance “marketplace” where members join together to insure political risks for cross-border 
investment, such as confiscation of property, inconvertibility of currency, and political violence. Only a small 
number of Lloyd’s syndicates offer investment insurance.
a  A partial risk guarantee covers private lenders against the risk of government failure to honor contractual obligations 
relating to private projects.
b  The Berne Union’s Prague Club was started in 1993 with funding from the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development. It is an information exchange network for new and maturing insurers of export credit and investment. 
The Prague Club supports members’ efforts to develop their export credit and investment insurance facilities by 
hosting technical discussions at twice-yearly meetings, as well as ad hoc information exchanges. A number of Prague 
Club members have gone on to meet the requirement for full Berne Union membership. 
Sources: Berne Union; Lloyd’s
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Berne Union Members
Company Country
Year  
joined
ASEI Indonesia 1999
ASHRA Israel 1958
CESCE Spain 1972
COFACE France 1948
COSEC Portugal 1977
ECGC India 1957
ECIC, SA South Africa 2004
EDC Canada 1947
EFIC Australia 1957
EGAP Czech Republic 1996
EkF Denmark 1997
EkN Sweden 1947
EXIMBANkA SR Slovak Republic 2004
EXIM J Jamaica 1983
FINNvERA Finland 1964
GIEk Norway 1951
HkEC Hong kong SAR, China 1969
kSURE korea, Rep. of 1977
kUkE Poland 1999
MEHIB Hungary 2000
MEXIM Malaysia 1985
NEXI Japan 1970
ODL Luxembourg 2011
OEkB Austria 1955
ONDD Belgium 1954
OPIC United States 1974
PWC Germany 1974
SACE Italy 1959
SBCE Brazil 2001
SERv Switzerland 1956
SID Slovenia 1998
SINOSURE China 1996
SLECIC Sri Lanka 1984
TEBC Taiwan, Rep. of China 1996
THAI EXIMBANk Thailand 2003
TURk EXIMBANk Turkey 1992
US EXIMBANk United States 1962
Uk Export Finance United kingdom 1934
Company Country
Year  
joined
Private
ATRADIUS Netherlands 1953
CGIC South Africa 1958
AIG United States 1999
ECICS Singapore 1979
EH GERMANY Germany 1953
FCIA United States 1963
HISCOX Bermuda 2008
SOvEREIGN Bermuda 2001
ZURICH United States 2001
Multilateral
ICIEC Multilateral 2007
MIGA Multilateral 1992
ATI Multilateral 2012
Berne Union and Prague Club Members
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Berne Union and Prague Club Members (cont’d)
Prague Club Members
Company Country
Year 
joined
Public
AOFI Serbia 2007
BAEZ Bulgaria 1997
BECI Botswana 2005
ECGA Oman 2000
ECGE Egypt, Arab Rep. 2003
ECIC SA South Africa 2002
ECIE UAE 2009
ECIO Greece 2011
EGAP Czech Republic 1993
EGFI Iran, Islamic Rep. of 1999
EXIAR Russian Federation 2012
EXIM R Romania 1993
EXIMBANkA SR Slovak Republic 1993
EXIMGARANT Belarus 1999
HBOR Croatia 1997
IGA Bosnia & Herzegovina 1999
IE Singapore 2011
JLGC Jordan 2001
kECIC kazakhstan 2004
kREDEX Estonia 1999
kUkE Poland 1993
LGA Latvia 2011
MBDP Macedonia, FYR 1999
MEHIB Hungary 1993
NAIFE Sudan 2007
NZECO New Zealand 2010
PHILEXIM Philippines 1997
SEP Saudi Arabia 2000
SID Slovenia 1993
TASDEER Qatar 2011
THAI EXIMBANk Thailand 1997
UkREXIMBANk Ukraine 2008
UZBEkINvEST Uzbekistan 1996
Company Country
Year 
joined
Private
LCI Lebanon 2009
Multilateral
ATI Multilateral 2002
DHAMAN Multilateral 2000
ICIEC Multilateral 2001
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Lloyd’s Syndicates 
Lloyd’s Syndicates
Company
ACE Global Markets
Amlin
Ark
Ascot
Aspen
Beazley
Canopius
Catlin 
Chaucer
Hardy
Hiscox
Jubilee
kiln
Liberty Syn. Mgmt.
Markel
Marketform
MAP
Novae
Starr PFR Consortium
O'Farrell
Pembroke
Talbot
XL
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InsurIng Investments   r   ensurIng opportunItIes

Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency 
World Bank Group
1818 H Street, NW 
Washington, DC 20433 USA
t. 202.458.2538
f. 202.522.0316
www.miga.org/wipr
